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January 5, 2012

[SSJ: 7075] Re: 7024] IR Theory and the Japan's Alliance Choices

From: Hiroaki Richard Watanabe
Date: 2012/01/05

I would like Paul Midford to understand my comments correctly or address them directly. For example, I did not say anything like 'China collapsing'. I said that China has some problems in its political economy (which I mentioned in a previous post) and the rise of China in the sense that it will become a hegemon in East Asia may not be guaranteed. Neo-realists (I assume Midford is one of them) do not see international relations in a sufficient manner from a perspective of domestic and international political economy. He has never referred to my point that emphasises the importance of a high degree of economic inter-dependence between China and Japan (and other East Asian countries) when we think about the international relations of East Asia, although military issues also matter.

"In addition, I will continue to avoid his points that range far from the main discussion, such as China's supposed lack of soft power (I address this in part in an upcoming co-authored article in International Studies Quarterly), or the (mis)reading of Paul Kennedy."


How can Midford say that Paul Kennedy's 'The rise and fall of the great powers' and China's soft power are far from the main discussion, when we discuss the rise of China?

"I don't know to whom this is addressed. I don't think anyone is suggesting that PM Noda suddenly propose a Sino-Japanese alliance out of the blue,."

This is addressed to Midford, but I did not say anything like 'PM Noda suddenly propose a Sino-Japanese alliance'. I would like Midford to avoid saying something extreme. We are talking about a Sino-Japanese alliance in a foreseeable future, not now.

"Also, we have to think about Japan's alliance options not in terms of the situation today, but beyond five years when China is projected to overtake the US in GDP, or when the US is no longer militarily dominant in the Western Pacific. Wishing thinking as a way to avoid these very real possibilities, i.e. by betting on China collapsing or assuming the US will always be dominant, is the intellectual equivalent of putting one's head in the sand."

As for his comment of wishful thinking, who can say so surely China would overtake the US in GDP in five years? That depends on different factors such as real growth rate, inflation rate and currency exchange rate.
I found an Economist article with a calculator that estimates when China may overtake the US in GDP and it is clear that China's number one position in the future depends on these factors (even if it is quite possible sometime later). It is also wishful thinking to assume that China continues growing in the current rate without thinking the possibility that Chinese economic growth may be decelerated, again in part due to some problems in its political economy. Can we also say so surely that the US will no longer dominant militarily in the Western Pacific in five years?

"Again, Japan already defends itself, and as such, it is not clear why Japan would have to change Article 9 or acquire larger offensive capabilities."

Currently, Japan defends itself 'under the US military protection' and this is very different from the situation where Japan would have to defend itself without such protection. Can we say that the US protection (or nuclear umbrella) does not make any difference in the degree of Japan's self-defense?
Midford says 'Japan already defends itself' as if the termination of the US-Japan alliance would not have any impact.

"As an end to the US-Japan alliance would significantly improve China's security situation by parrying the potent US threat, it would have every incentive to accept Japan having a robust territorial defense, especially as Japan is no longer a candidate regional hegemon regardless of how pessimistic one wants to be about what sort of regime it might have in the future."


Is this a reasonable way of thinking even if we understand that Japan is no longer a candidate of regional hegemon? What 'evidence' can Midford have to say that China has this incentive? Is this not an example of 'A vague characterisation is a poor substitute for a clear argument with concrete examples'?

"It is also worth noting that some Chinese foreign policy scholars are arguing that China is already becoming more accepting of a Japan with a robust defense capability (see Jianwei Wang's chapter in the new Soeya, Tadokoro and Welch volume on Japan as a Normal Country)."

Do a majority of Chinese people and the Chinese Communist Party accept a Japan with a robust defense capability in the same way as some Chinese scholars mentioned by Midford?

"All of my posts have been precisely about this:
identifying some of the incentives that Japan might have to consider other alliance options, albeit without claiming that these benefits necessarily outweigh the ones Japan receives from its alliance with the US."

I asked Midford what incentives American and Japanese political actors have in dismantling the US-Japanese alliance for the conclusion of a Sino-Japanese alliance but I have not heard of anything from him.

"Again, the above is a vague argument: what are the institutional constraints? How difficult would it be to replace them with equal or better institutions? How flexible are the existing institutions? Can they really adapt to a region that is experiencing major shifts in the balance of power and other changes without becoming atavistic?"

The US-Japan alliance has existed since 1951 (revised in 1960) for 60 years and a number of administrative agreements and defense guidelines were concluded between these two countries to maintain this alliance even after the end of the Cold War. These agreements and guidelines have worked as an institutional framework and cannot be breached so easily only by a decision of one party. Even when the DPJ's Hatoyama administration tried to achieve a relatively small thing such as relocating Futenma Airbase, it was not successful as a result of the US opposition. The US has a large stake and great interests in maintaining US bases in Japan to maintain the stability of East Asia, so it is very unlikely for the US to agree to the termination of this alliance. On the Japanese side, there are constitutional (and normative) constrains, especially Article 9, which denies Japan's possession of military forces and has made Japan rely on American forces for its defense. Although it is true that there were reviews of this alliance after the end of the Cold War, what these two countries actually chose was the maintenance, or even strengthening, of this alliance.
So it would be unlikely, at least for the time being, that this alliance would be replaced with alternative alliance or institutions. In addition, due to the legacy of history, other East Asian countries would oppose militarisation of Japan, which they are afraid of seeing as a possible result of the termination of the US-Japan alliance. The US-Japan alliance does not need to be replaced by equal or better alliance.
Instead, it can be supplemented by and co-exist with multilateral institutions in East Asia (such as APT and ARF).

"although that would have to be balanced against the deterrence gains (just as Japan would not challenge a nuclearly armed China in territory it controls China would exercise the same restraint vis-a-vis a nuclear armed Japan, although it already largely does so anyway). Also, China would be less opposed if there was a Sino-Japanese alliance or strategic rapprochement."

This only sounds like a Realist theoretical fiction. I wonder if Midford can show us any evidence that what he says above is likely to happen.

"I will defer to others who know Britain better than I do, although the British comparison seems a bit overly idealized. Certainly in the case of the US, right-wing violence seemingly supported by the statements of elected officials is anything but unheard of. The Oklahoma City bombing or the Branch Davidian cases were, in terms of violence, an order of magnitude larger than anything the post-war Japanese right-wing has ever carried out."

I am not idealising Britain at all, but I know that people can criticise or ridicule the Royal family even in public or mass media. I have lived in the UK for many years. This situation is very different from Japan, where people are likely to feel psychological pressure or intimidated if they try to do the same to the imperial family partly as a result of the past violence and attacks by extreme right-wings. This is not an issue of the size of violence as Midford mentioned in the case of the Oklahoma incident.

Hiro Watanabe


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Dr. Hiroaki Richard Watanabe, D.Phil. Oxford, MA Yale Lecturer, School of East Asian Studies, University of Sheffield

http://www.shef.ac.uk/seas/staff/japanese/watanabe.html
http://www.wreac.org/people/WREAC-People/Core-Researche
rs/Watanabe%2C-Hiroaki-Richard/details

Approved by ssjmod at 01:11 PM