As a layman, I'd like to thank the contributors to this thread. Will all due respect to Ellis Krauss who wrote:

>As has often been the
>case in the past, apparent strong disagreement winds
up being close to
>agreement on many points once our views are fleshed
out.
>
Let's not rush to consensus. Even differences of nuance are helpful for those of us trying to get a grip on the situation. Now for some questions mainly directed at Paul Midford.

First of all, in regard to "balance of threats,"
whatever domineering postures Washington has exhibited toward Japan, I believe--and I suspect most Japanese policymakers believe--that China would likely be a far less benevolent hegemon than the US. It would seem to me that Japan and other Asian nations would rather "bring the US back to Asia" and seek reassurance from the US than rely on the benevolence of Beijing. The rare earth embargo--or unilateral claims to ownership of the South China Sea up backed up by clashes using fishing boats backed by naval vessels--are not exactly an enticing invitations. I suspect a Sino-Japanese alliance would be even more of an "unequal partnership"

than what Hatoyama et. al. have decried in the Japan-US relationship.

PM wrote:

>Also, we have to think about Japan's alliance options
not in terms of
>the situation today, but beyond five years when ...
the US is no longer
>militarily dominant in the Western Pacific.
>
Are you projecting that China will be successful in its apparent effort to eliminate or diminish US aircraft carrier ability the Sea of Japan (or the whole area West of what China calls the "First Island chain"? Or simply that there will be some sort of co-existence between a rising China and the US? More importantly, how do Japanese policymakers assess the prospects for US dominance in this region?

PM wrote:

>In my previous posts I did not suggest that I
currently see any
>political elites advocating an alliance with China,
and I certainly do
>not see that (again, I think it is useful to compare
the alliance with
>other options and to address suggestions that Japan
would suffer a
>terrible fate in a China dominated East Asia,
>

You seem to be suggesting that the main driver of a change in this elite view would be a more powerful China and a more absent US? I guess the prospect of cuts in US defense spending is not welcome in such quarters.
But, in a choice of lesser evils, one could imagine a very different response to that situation than a Sino-Japanese alliance.

PM wrote:

>As Ellis and I have discussed in person, some Japanese
politicians have
>found their constituents are perennially skeptical of
the claim that
>the US would actually defend Japan in a war).
>
I have had conversations with some senior Foreign Ministry offcicials who expressed the same skepticism.
"Would the US really sacrifice Los Angeles to save Osaka?" is a formualation I have heard more than once.
To me, this is a very dangerous perception. My layman's view is that the entire US posture--to be able to deter war by showing one can win it--relies on the credibiilty of the security umbrella.

PM wrote:

>if Japan really saw China as a threat, like it does
North Korea or did
>with the Soviet Union in the past, it would not trade
with them for
>fear of building up a military threat, not to mention
the dangers of
>becoming dependent.
>
If memory serves, prior to WWI, Britain and Germany were each other's largest trading partners (or at least one of their largest trading
partners) and Kaiser Bill was a grandson of Queen Victoria. This mistakenly led some to forecast that such interdependence made war extremely unlikely.

I would make the opposite argument from yours.
Precisely because China is a potential threat, economic interchange becomes even more necessary.
I think the conventional wisdom is the following: since war with China is not permissible, China needs to be changed from a potential threat into a partner over the long haul through what the Chinese damn as a strategy of "peaceful evolution." I.e. the hope that economic development and interdependence will slowly bring to power the more cosmopolitan, less ideological factions within the Chinese Communist party, and over a few decades lead to a more liberal, pluralistic and perhaps even democratic, regime. The transition will, however, be dicey.

BTW a question for anyone who knows: Filipinos have started using the term "West Philippines Sea" instead of "South China Sea" to undermine Chinese claims to the Sea right up the waters of the Philippines.
Hillary Clinton used the term during her visit to Manilla. Does anyone know if she or other senior US officials have used this term--or stopped using the term "South China Sea"--anywhere else?

Richard Katz
The Oriental Economist Report