In a bid to help get the consumption tax hike through the Diet, the DPJ has announced a plan to reduce the number of Diet seats. Polls have showed that 55-60% of respondents oppose a consumption tax hike and opposition keeps rising. However, polls like a recent one in Mainichi, suggest that people would be somewhat less oppose if politicans also "made sacrifices"
through pay cuts and a reduction in the number of seats. Only a week ago, Okada seemed to oppose doing anything now, according to Kyodo:

> On reducing the number of House of Representatives
members through
> electoral reform, Okada said, 'It is impossible to
undertake radical
> reform before the next election. Discussions should
be conducted on
> how we can reduce the quota on the basis of keeping
the existing
> institution.'

It seems that the rising discontent over the tax hike may have changed some minds.

The plan would also follow a Supreme Court decision that a 2.3-to-1 disparity in votes in the most rural and urban districts is unconstitutional. By elminating one seat each in 5 prefectures, the widest disparity would be 2:1.

The biggest curiosity is the decision to reduce 80 seats in proportional representation section. This raises a number of questions about the DPJ's motivation and mechanics that I hope experts can answer:

1) On the one hand, it would reduce the power of the small parties and is strongly opposed by them. Even though at one level it might seem to help the LDP, it would damage the LDP's alliance with the Komeito, which has been the LDP-Komeito alliance's vote-getter the urban seats. The Communist Party has calculated that if the DPJ plan had prevailed in
2009 and the votes were the same, the DPJ would have ended up with 68% of the total LH seats despite earning only 42% of the PR votes and 47% of SMD seats. In 2009, it won 64% of total LH seats Does anyone know if that is an accurate calculation?

2) On the other hand, doesn't the PR system act to even out the urban-rural malaportionment beyond just the extremes? The PR seats come from 11 blocs. How even is the distribution among them? Does any know how the 80 seat reduction would be accomplished. It would seem to that, if the core of the DPJ's support base is in the cities, the party is ill-advised to reduce the urban voice in the LH. Even if the DPJ as a whole is advantaged, its urban wing--the bigger voice for
reform-- might be disadvantaged. Any informed opinions on this?

3) Noda has said that, if the Diet fails to pass the tax hike--which I think is pretty much a foregone conclusion--then he may call a snap election, which is exactly what the LDP has been seeking. I'm trying to figure out Noda's electoral logic here. Perhaps he thinks that, if he adds the Diet seat reduction, that will help. Or, if he can make the LDP look too obstructionist, that will help? I don't know. In the latest Mainichi poll, the DPJ and LDP each had a support rate of 17%, while 48% supported no party.

Richard Katz
The Oriental Economist Report