While I appreciate the attention that Hiroaki Richard Watanabe lavished on my post, he clearly misunderstood some of it. In particular, I never “proposed” that Japan should terminate its alliance with the US, and even less so that Japan “should” obtain nuclear weapons. The only thing I did propose is that Japan apply zero-base accounting to its security policy, begin with a blank slate, and consider what the country needs for its security. In that context it should evaluate alliance with the US as one possibly useful (or possibly even the best) means to ensure its security. Otherwise, Japan cannot evaluate the alliance and what it is worth investing to maintain or perhaps even strengthen it.

Yet, when politicians and public figures start such debates they are quickly shunned in Japan, although not necessarily overseas. Former Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro’s suggestion that Japan should reduce the US-Japan alliance down to nothing more than the US nuclear umbrella, or Ozawa Ichiro’s suggestion that the only US bases Japan needs are naval bases for the US Seventh fleet, are two examples. One doesn’t have to like the messenger (i.e. Ozawa) or agree with their proposals (in addition to the nuclear umbrella and US naval bases, having US air force bases is also in Japan’s interest in my view, although not Marines or other ground troops which mostly just duplicate GSDF
capabilities) to recognize the value for Japanese security of debating, rather than suppressing, these ideas. Both proposals are certainly well within the range of the mainstream security studies and IR, and significantly more conservative than Menon’s proposal.

Beyond that, it’s hard to respond because Watanabe-san’s post because is all over the map. It is clearly contradictory to claim on the one hand that realism and the military balance of power are “out of date” and then turn around and claim that Japan needs the US alliance. If military power doesn’t matter anymore then the DPJ can cancel its military buildup, the alliance can be terminated, and the US, Japan, and China, can draw down their military forces. The fact that none of that is happening is all the evidence we need to conclude that the military balance of power and realism still matter. Realism and the balance of power do not explain everything in international politics by any means, but they do explain one very important and basic dimension.

“Such ideas as ‘alliance with China based on a balance-of-power strategy’….sound very unrealistic and show insufficient understanding of the history of the Sino-Japanese relationship.”

Watanabe-san did not seem to notice my point that balance of threat theory rather than balance of power theory does a better job explaining alliance choices.
In balance of threat theory historically-based perceptions play an important role in alliance and balancing choices. Indeed, I have written much about the impact of historically based perceptions of Japan and take the history factor far more seriously than most of the security literature (and have been criticized for doing so). Nonetheless, even I would not claim that history is wholly determinative.
History is clearly a very significant barrier to a possible Sino-Japanese alliance, but historically based perceptions certainly do not preclude an alliance.
After all, looking at the history of US-Japan relations from the vantage point of 1945 would hardly have made one optimistic about the prospects for a future US-Japan alliance.

“statements such as ‘Japan needs courage to ask itself whether the US-Japan alliance best serves its interests’ could be made only by those who would not face any serious consequences with the end of alliance unlike many Japanese people.’’’

What “serious” consequences would those be? I would add that the describing possible strategic alternatives for Japan as “crude” or “simplistic” is a poor substitute for concrete arguments and examples. More than anything else, this passage reminds me of my original point, although on reflection perhaps I should broaden the critique beyond some parts of the LDP and Yomiuri Shimbun and note that this is a more general problem for political elites in Japan: for a country with such great power resources Japanese political elites display a truly shocking lack of confidence in their country’s influence and importance for the rest of the world, not least of all for the US.

“If the situation in East Asia changed and the US would not be able to provide reliable protection of Japan, which is unlikely to happen at least in the foreseeable future, Japan could still maintain alliance with the US as long as it is useful to some extent and at the same time deepen its commitment to regional multilateral institutions without dismantling the US-Japan alliance and opting for a nuclear option.”

In many ways this is a perfectly reasonable point. Too bad it’s extremely difficult to propose or debate such options in Japan today.

“It would also be extremely costly to dismantle deeply institutionalised security mechanisms such as the US-Japan alliance.”

Does the cost of dismantlement make dismantlement not worth the effort? For example, should Japan’s postal banking system not be dismantled simply because it is costly to do so? (note: this is only an example, I am neutral on the postal banking system). Institutions have to prove their continued worth, or else be discontinued, costly though that may be in the short run. They cannot be allowed to survive simply out of inertia.

“‘Due to Japanese growing military capacity, the US-Japan alliance would be unnecessary’ only show their lack of recognition of importance of public opinion among Japanese people and again the likely outcries from the international community. The revision of Article 9 would be very difficult too.”

As someone who just authored the first full-length academic monograph on the influence of public opinion on Japanese foreign policy published in the last 50 years (in English at least), I certainly agree that public opinion is very influential. But who said anything about changing Article 9? Not me. Japan did not need to change Article 9 to have an alliance with the US, and I see no reason why it would need to do so to align with China. With the possible exception of perhaps developing a nuclear arsenal, who said anything about Japan significantly building up its military capacity? Not me. Japan has had a robust autonomous territorial defense capacity for many decades already.
To reinforce this robust capacity in the face of China’s rise the DPJ has launched one of the largest submarine buildups of the post-war era, and is building up Japan’s territorial defenses in the Nansei-shoto, yet this has not created an “international outcry,” and has barely even attracted criticism from China.
Japanese public opinion strongly supports strengthening territorial defense, including of the outer islands and missile defense. What public opinion opposes is sending the SDF overseas for combat operations, as well as nuclear weapons. A Chinese ally would be much less likely than the US ally to pressure Japan to send the SDF overseas for combat operations (the only plausible reason for amending Article 9), although admittedly US pressure in this direction is now declining.

A final point about nuclear weapons: I entirely agree that public opinion is a formidable barrier to Japan acquiring nuclear weapons, as I argue in chapter 3 of my book. Yet, public opinion responds to changes in the real world, and if Japan did end the US alliance that large shift in the environment could produce change in public opinion on this issue (Watanabe san’s comment about Japanese people anticipating big consequences to the end of the alliance would seem to imply this as well), although I am not predicting that.
Having a nuclear deterrent might give Japan, and possibly even its public, some extra assurance if Japan were non-aligned or aligned with China, but I doubt Japan would really need such its own deterrent for the reasons I outlined previously.

“If ordinary Japanese people hear these proposals, most of them would probably think these proposals were made by extreme right-wings…”

Which Japanese right-wing extremists are proposing a Sino-Japanese alliance?

“Despite being a creation of the Cold War, the US-Japan alliance is still relevant and important to the US, Japan, China and other East Asian countries for different reasons, including its usefulness to contain ‘Japanese nationalists’. Contrary to Menon’s statement that Japanese nationalists are hardly militarists, they could still be dangerous,…”

This seems to be an endorsement of the
“cap-in-the-bottle” rationale (more generally known as the pacta du contrahendo alliance function identified by Paul Schroeder) for the alliance. While I have written that the alliance has had a perceptual reassurance value in this respect vis-à-vis third countries, it has less reassurance value for China today, especially if compared with a Sino-Japanese alliance. More importantly, there is no reason for believing that the US alliance serves as a real cap in the bottle holding back a “resurgence of Japanese militarism.” Are Japanese nationalists are “dangerous”? In the sense that right-wing extremists such as the John Birch Society are dangerous, yes, perhaps that is the case. Yet, what matters is that Japanese extreme right-wingers, like John Birchers, are politically feeble. Koizumi’s failure to rehabilitate visits to Yasukuni clearly shows the weakness of Japanese nationalists generally. Japanese right-wingers have no more potential for becoming politically influential than do right-wingers in any advanced democracy (and probably less potential than in the case of the US).

Paul Midford