Ellis Krauss wrote:

>a rational strategy for next election: let the
conservative Noda raise
>taxes and try to come to consensus with LDP for a
year; if he fails or
>succeeds but either way proves (as is likely)
unpopular, then bring in
>Maehara before the next election (i.e., consider Noda
a temporary
>leader)
>
>

Lots of interesting comments on Noda to read after coming back from vacation. The notion of Noda as a sacrificial lamb has an appeal. But a couple questionscome to mind:

1) What is the incentive for the LDP to cooperate with the DPJ rather than try to force an early election, as long as the polls continue to show that gridlock is hurting the DPJ more than the LDP? We'll see how long Noda's initial bounce lasts? Tanigaki keeps talking about trying to force an early election.

2) What is the incentive for the LDP (or DPJ Diet
members) to support a hike in the consumption tax prior to an LH election? We see how well that worked for the DPJ in 2009 (not to mention the LDP in 1989 and 1998)

Could it be that Kan was angry at Maehara for helping to force him out?

The DPJ has a genuine dilemma in that the LDP has proved it can successfully prevent the DPJ from governing, so that the DPJ keeps asking for cooperation. They are the one in the position of begging.

Richard Katz
The Oriental Economist Report