I guess one of the most difficult tasks of political scientists and historians
is to place a PM in history. For example even in postwar history the assessment
of Yoshida Shigeru has reversed completely after the mid-1960s with Kosaka
Masataka's book. The now highly praised PM had been portrayed, to the best of my
knowledge, a snobbish, obstinate dictator until then.

The letters to the editor page of the Economist (Aug 19) has two letters by
former leaders of states--Helmut Schmidt and Malcolm Fraser--expressing their
disappointment to an earlier obituary of Fukuda Takeo.

Should these letters be considered as old boys protecting each others
reputation, or is it warning to our tendency to see all (Japanese) politics, or
all (Japanese) politicians corrupt?

How can we evaluate the role Fukuda Takeo played as one of the top leaders
between 1972 (his defeat to Tanaka Kakuei) to 1978 (his defeat to O'hira
Masayoshi). How corrupt was Fukuda, and more importantly to me, how can we
analyze his leadership during economic difficulties during the first oil crisis?
Or to put it another way, can we say Fukuda was a successful leader of economic
policy, facing a major crisis, as compared to Takemura? If so what was the
nature of his leadership, what kind of resources could he mobilize that Takemura
cannot?

At least it seems to me Fukuda, who lacked a capable spokesman in the media,
might be one of the most under-researched (if not underestimated) PMs in postwar
history, considering he was at the pinnacle of power at historical cross-roads.

I think Fukuda might be a good case to think what is required to be a "leader"
in the Japanese political context, and to go beyond the notion all Japanese
leaders are ineffective and/or puppets.

Nobuhiro Hiwatari