>On Sun, 18 Jun 1995 nh203[atx]cus.cam.ac.uk (Nobuhiro Hiwatari) wrote:

>(1) What are the strategies/calculations (or miscalculations) of the major actors, such as the Japanese automobile companies and MITI? In what way are they rational/irrational?

In regard to Prof. Hiwatari's first question, my recent conversation with Japanese auto industry people as well as some journalists covering the industry or MITI might provide some clues.

First, they all said that MITI does not want another STA (Semiconductor Trade Agreement)-sort of target. For its diplomatic naiveness, MITI did not think that the 20 percent clause in the famous side-letter would become a "promise." MFA was outraged afterwards.

A sort of division between the Industrial Policy Bureau and International Trade Bureau within MITI persisted for a long time, the former being more powerful.
Neverthreless, recent personnel assignment suggests that the Kodama faction took both positions after the coup attempt against Naito and his followers. This is likely to narrow the policy gap between the two bureaus.

The auto industry has in fact invested extensively in the U.S., and they are fully mobilizing their public relations network in the U.S. (knowing that direct lobbying to Congress nor Clinton Administration would be not just wasteful but counter-productive.) The American parts industry is in a fuzzy position, since many companies in the industry already have established some relationship with the Japanese auto manufacturers, both in Japan and the U.S. They are afraid of losing what they've got. Both MITI and the auto industry seem to be counting their lobbying success on this point.

Yoichiro Sato (ABD)
Department of Political Science
University of Hawaii at Manoa