I have been enjoying the very lively on-going discussion in this forum on the possible effects of Japan's new electoral system upon election-campaigning, the party system, party politics, and Japanese politics in general. It is a very interesting and exciting period to all of us interested in Japanese politics. We are very fortunate to be provided with an opportunity to review existing general theories on the subjects, confront currently changing empirical situations, and make predictions about the future of Japanese politics. We feel still more fortunate when we remember that the former Soviet Union had already collapsed by the time IR scholars realized the fundamental changes taking place in the international system.

On the discussion on Japanese electoral politics, I have seen several hypotheses that are very interesting and very much needed in light of theory-building and -testing. But I am inclined to agree with Prof. Curtis's implicit view in favor of close empirical observation, as much as I agree on the need for the generation and testing of hypotheses. Here, I would like to share with those interested yet another possible course for Japan's electoral politics which empirical observation suggests to us, in addition to or instead of the hypotheses and predictions already made.

The alternative possibility I see is the institution of further significant modifications to the newly installed single-member district system with regional proportional representation, before the current new system exists sufficiently long to produce any significant change in the behavior of candidates in election campaigns, the party system (particularly, the # of viable parties), the importance of issue elections, etc., which may otherwise take place. The likelihood of either a complete reversion to the old multi-member district system or the complete repeal of the single-member district system may be very low. But other sorts of varying combinations of modifications to the single-member system are at least plausible, if not imminent.

While few politicians are bold or unwise enough to propose the immediate abolition of the single-member district system at this moment--that is, even before the first general election under the new system--, several leading politicians have started publicly criticizing the single-member system with P.R.
Some have begun publicly talking about the possibility of considering, or at least their wish for, the initiation of an effort at another revision to the single-member district system with P.R. For instance, the president of the LDP
PARC, Koichi Kato, attributes the inability of politicians and parties to present clear policy objectives, visions, and appeals and the resulting distrust of politicians among the public, to the single-member distrit system (Asahi Shimbun, 5/25/95). He explains that it is difficult for politicians to take clear, original, and innovative policy initiatives in the single-member system because candidates need to gain 51 percent and appeal to 70 percent of votes to be elected in the system and thus can establish only vague, general policy appeals in order to cater to a wide variety of voters. Keeping policy appeals ambiguous seems to be a strategy in the U.S., also, to an extent.

Shusei Tanaka, general secretary of the Sakigake that was one of the most adamant advocates of electoral reform, now publicly discusses the need to abolish the regional block district system of P.R. in favor of either a single national district or a multi-member district system with multiple votes (Asahi Shimbun, 5/25/95). His reasoning is that the regional block districts make it difficult for candidates with policy vision but without local campaign machines, money, etc. to be elected. He also criticizes the single-member district system for its incapability of being responsive to variegated public views and needs. So, too, does Funada of the New Frontier Party (Asahi Shimbun, 5/29/95). Added to these are, of course, those politicians who were originally opposed to the introduction of the new electoral system. Opposition to the new system has always been there since before the reform. But this time, even those who supported the reform have begun to criticize the new system.

These criticisms of or complaints about the new system are due to difficulties politicians and parties are having in dividing and allocating districts, collecting money, etc., and all other pains associated with adjusting to a new situation. And the criticisms and complaints may disappear as politicians become used to the new system and as the system continues electing those more adept and adaptive under the new system. The incentive for initiating another electoral reform will certainly be far less after several elections. Those elected under the new system will be against another reform. Politicians also know the danger of further alienating the electorate by engaging in another reform. Furthermore, the costs of another reform would be prohibitively large. There are thus a number of forces against new reform.

But at least for the moment, there are still many politicians who are negative about and wish to change the new system, represented by anti-reform LDP members such as Junichiro Koizumi and Yoshinobu Shimamura. We can also expect such opposition to the single-member district system, which puts small parties at a disadvantage, to last for a while especially when the existing parties are not very likely to merge into two right away. The new liberal party the Socialists plan to develop into along with other liberal conservatives will also probably remain a viable third party, at least for a while, with the help of P.R. districts.

Opposition to the single-member district system might pick up force if, for instance, the system frequently voted out incumbents. Also, customs, habits, and styles in politicians' campaigning such as the use of the koenkai and personal appeals will surely survive as information and feedback mechanisms are imperfect, and institutions are sticky. And such politicians may have difficulty establishing electoral security, and if this happens, it may again increase the incentives for electoral reform. Thus, depending on the accumulation of random factors and small events and decisions, the move toward another electoral reform may remain strong, just as the new system may be firmly institutionalized.

This possibility may be uninteresting and even be regarded irrelevant in light of analysis of the effects of the electoral system upon politics. But it does remain an at least theoretical possibility that I think is worth investigation.

Ph.D. candidate, UC, Santa Barbara
Visiting Researcher, Chuo U