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June 4, 1995
[SSJ: 23] On Debating Rational Choice
From: Steven R Reed
Posted Date: 1995-06-04
I agree with Professor Kang that it should be an empirical question, how much rat choice helps or does not. There are ideologues on both sides of the debate. On the other hand, I do not think it is a sterile debate. Debates about methodology and what approaches are or are not making progress are at the heart of scientific discourse.
My fundamental position is that debates which use data are likely to produce more light than heat and debates without data are likelty to produce more heat than light. Data can by no means be limited to quantifiable data.
It is often true that culturalists (or other anti-rat choicers) define a rat choicer as one who believes that human beings are capable of calculations that no super computer could possibly perform. (The definition of a rat choicer as someone whose research Chalmers Johnson does not like is only slightly less inclusive.) Rat choicers on the other hand often seem to define "them" as people who believe that human beings are incapable of distinguishing between $5 and $500. By these definitions, almost everyone is always one of us.
My quarrel with rational choice approaches starts with the fact that they often ignore the data. (I am sometimes tempted to say that Rosenbluth, Cox, Ramseyer, Kohno, et al., are not rat choicers when they use data, and therefore are one of "me".) The data strongly suggest that people do not maximize utility in any meaningful sense. That assumption is either tautological or false. I do not think it is a helpful place to start.
On the other hand, I do think that it is often extremely helpful to start with statements like, in this situation there is an incentive to do X. Game theory, in particular, is bad psychology, but excellent at describing situations, strategic incentives, etc. Green and Shapiro suggest that rat choice predictions often work well at the margin, ie, people do not maximize but neither do they ignore the incentives in their environment. It seems to me that they way to apply rat choice analysis to empirical puzzles is to analyze the incentives and then see how much people actually respond to them. Analyzing a single incentive is a good start, but it would be even better if we could analyze more than one at a time.
I am also fascinated with when people make errors in calculation and really appreciate the work done by Cox, Rosenbluth, and Kohno on this topic.
Finally, let me say that I do not consider myself a rat choicer but neither do I consider rat choicers my "enemies" in any sense. Disagreements over methodology are the life blood of science. Physicists do it. I am reading a collection of interviews with leading lights in the "cognitive sciences" called SPEAKING MINDS. These people all think their friends are badly mistaken, but they are all friends engaged in a common enterprise. They admit when the other guy has made a good point and even admit when they have been wrong.
Why can't we do this? My guess is that the perceived influence academic studies have on US-Japan relations is the key to understanding how such an academic debate can get so far out of hand. "They" become the enemies because if their advice were followed, it would lead to ruin and destruction. I am happy in my ivory tower.
Approved by ssjmod at 04:14 PM