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November 4, 2025

JPOSS, 6/19 ET: Shusuke Ioku, "Weapons of the Weak: Population Mobility and the Construction of the State in Early Modern Japan"

From: Fujihira, Shinju <sfujihira@wcfia.harvard.edu>
Date: 2025/06/07

Dear Colleagues, 

 

We write to invite you to the next JPOSS session: 

 

U.S. ET: June 19 (Thu), 8-9 PM 

JST: June 20 (Fri), 9-10 AM 

Event page (with paper): https://jposs.org/event/ioku-06-19-2025/

Zoom registration: https://harvard.zoom.us/meeting/register/Pq6WomRTTpGQMrveS9XdYA#/registration

 

Title: "Weapons of the Weak: Population Mobility and the Construction of the State in Early Modern Japan"

Author: Shusuke Ioku (University of Rochester)

Discussants: Francisco Garfias (UCSD), Chiaki Moriguchi (Hitotsubashi University)

Chair: Amy Catalinac (NYU)

 

Abstract:Throughout history, subjects' exit threats have constrained state power, yet this mechanism has received far less scholarly attention than collective confrontational resistance. I address this gap by (i) formally identifying conditions under which population mobility negatively affects state taxation, and (ii) providing empirical evidence for this relationship using the ideal historical context of Tokugawa Japan--a setting with nearly 300 autonomous domains sharing basic institutional features while exhibiting remarkably divergent tax rates (20-70%). Using newly digitized data on domain capitals, 40,086 villages, and records of peasant revolts, I demonstrate that peripheral villages--those farther from their home capital and closer to foreign capitals--more frequently resisted through exit rather than collective confrontation. I further show that domains with more peripheral village distributions imposed lower tax rates, a pattern that persists after accounting for various alternative mechanisms. Additional evidence suggests that family ties among neighboring rulers moderated tax competition, further supporting the mobility-taxation relationship. 

 

The paper is also attached on this email. Many thanks to our presenter and discussants, and we look forward to your participation! 

 

Best wishes, 

Amy Catalinac, Christina Davis, Shinju Fujihira, Yusaku Horiuchi, Saori Katada, Phillip Lipscy, and Dan Smith 

 

--
Shinju Fujihira, Ph.D. (he/him/his)  

藤平新樹

Executive Director

Program on U.S.-Japan Relations  

Weatherhead Center for International Affairs

Harvard University

URL ; LinkedIn

Approved by ssjmod at 06:09 PM