Hi everyone -

Thanks to everyone for this discussion.

I appreciate Dr. Wilkins's point here, but I think I'm a little more skeptical about the historical reconciliation aspect of Abe's actions. I'm not saying this to bash him in particular; there's a lot of blame to go around for the comfort women agreement debacle from a few years back.

It is risky, of course, to work on the basis of one model, but it's important to remember that before German apologies for the Holocaust (which were themselves the outcomes of a fairly tortuous process of debates over collective/national guilt and the appropriate role for the postwar West German state or its chancellor in making amends), there were precious few examples of governments engaging in determined efforts at historical reconciliation. One lost the war, paid reparations or lost territory, and forever had the stain of defeat written on them; the human victims of war were largely non-entities as far as diplomatic practice was concerned. And so while leaning too hard on the German example might be misleading, it's worth noting that the widely praised nature of German behavior didn't arise from just a single apology, or Willy Brandt falling to his knees at the Warsaw Ghetto; it has instead been a determined effort to make reconciliation and observation of collective guilt a central part of postwar West German and German politics, with this as a central theme in public education and in commemoration.

What Abe did -- whether one admires or likes it or not -- was quite different, and I don't think it's likely to be taken as a model for meaningful reconciliation at the diplomatic or even interpersonal level. His famous statement on the 70th anniversary of the war ticked off all the requested keywords, though almost in brackets as a list (e.g. "Incident, aggression, war -- we shall never again resort to any form of the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes" in the official English-language translation) before turning to this passage (again, official English translation: https://japan.kantei.go.jp/97_abe/statement/201508/0814statement.html):

> In Japan, the postwar generations now exceed eighty per cent of its population. We must not let our children, grandchildren, and even further generations to come, who have nothing to do with that war, be predestined to apologize. Still, even so, we Japanese, across generations, must squarely face the history of the past. We have the responsibility to inherit the past, in all humbleness, and pass it on to the future.
>
> Our parents' and grandparents' generations were able to survive in a devastated land in sheer poverty after the war. The future they brought about is the one our current generation inherited and the one we will hand down to the next generation. Together with the tireless efforts of our predecessors, this has only been possible through the goodwill and assistance extended to us that transcended hatred by a truly large number of countries, such as the United States, Australia, and European nations, which Japan had fiercely fought against as enemies.
>
> We must pass this down from generation to generation into the future. We have the great responsibility to take the lessons of history deeply into our hearts, to carve out a better future, and to make all possible efforts for the peace and prosperity of Asia and the world.

So, yes, an apology, but a fair amount of attention on a near future in which Japanese won't be be expected to apologize. Whatever one thinks of that sentiment, one imagines that Willy Brandt's gesture would have been viewed as far less meaningful if he'd followed up by saying, "Listen, I'm doing this so the next generation won't have to."

And with the comfort women agreement, note the centrality of this language: "While stating the above, the Government of Japan confirms that this issue is resolved finally and irreversibly with this announcement, on the premise that the Government will steadily implement the measures specified in (2) above" (https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/na/kr/page4e_000364.html). Indeed, this was the aspect of the agreement that other conservatives, particularly Inada Tomomi, really emphasized afterward: not guilt, not contrition, but a statement that the deal was the deal, and that was that.

One can argue that Abe achieved something remarkable here: he made the apology (though to Park Geun-hye, who isn't taken by anyone to be a particularly credible representative of the former comfort women, rather than to the surviving victims themselves), and managed to secure an agreement from the Park government that this basically ended the matter. And all's fair, I guess: c'est la guerre (et ses conséquences). But while there is a pretty robust history of Germany's continued apologies to victims of Nazi atrocities have been instrumental to burnishing its global history, there's not much history of an apology that comes with a "and that's that, stop bugging us about it" clause being a durable diplomatic stance.

I'm not saying what Abe should have done; it's possible that Jennifer Lind's work on backlash politics is correct, and that anything further would have produced even more recalcitrance on the part of the Japanese Right. And I don't see how that would be particularly good for anyone.

But my own sense is that the comfort women agreement (and even the 70th anniversary statement) were directed as much at Washington as at the victims of Japanese wartime behavior. The US government had been leaning on Japan and South Korea for years to resolve these historical tensions, which obviously can limit cooperation between America's two strongest allies in the region. My guess is that Abe and his team suspected that this comfort women agreement would be extremely controversial in South Korea, and that further tensions would likely be seen to emanate from that side. At which point, I think the argument would become, "See? We tried, and this is what they get. They're too emotional and not rational enough." Or something like that. And my sense is that that likely worked, though I don't feel like doing the research right now to buttress my general sense that DC-based policy/diplomacy specialists have largely celebrated Abe's putatively conciliatory behavior and expressed frustration with the seemingly excessive nationalism of Korean activists who

I could be wrong, as I don't know what was going on in Abe's head. And I do worry that describing Abe as a "nationalist" (which he obviously is in myriad ways) obfuscates the complex set of issues he pushed as Japanese foreign policy. But I did want to say here that if we are to view his actions as successful in terms of historical reconciliation, I think I'd want to both qualify and redefine that. I don't think reconciliation has been fully on the table, and I think that many of Abe's allies think that shouldn't be Japan's responsibility or its goal. Rather, I think the goal was to use diplomacy to deal with the history issue in a way that extended certain important expressions of responsibility and apology with the expectation of a diminution or elimination of criticism, reminders, or accusatory commemorations in the future.

I don't mean this as a generic slam on Abe. Especially as an American, since our government almost never apologies for anything (internment of Japanese-Americans, overthrow of Hawaii excepted), I'm not really in a position to point fingers at Abe. But before celebrating his diplomatic achievements -- and they are achievements! -- as historical reconciliation, I think I'd rather hold out the possibility that these are somewhat closer to tactical efforts to delegitimize future criticism and to promote unproblematic patriotism rather than to meaningful endeavors to develop strong ties based on a shared understanding of the region's history.

Anyway, just my thoughts. Now back to recording lectures in Japanese for my hybrid courses this fall, and into the vortex of self-loathing that this produces. Talk about a need for reconciliation....

Best wishes,

Dave


David Leheny
Professor
Graduate School of Asia-Pacific Studies
dleheny@waseda.jp



> On Sep 17, 2020, at 12:05, SSJ-Forum Moderator <ssjmod@iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp> wrote:
>
> From: Thomas Wilkins <thomas.wilkins@sydney.edu.au>
>
> Date: 2020/09/10
>
> It's worth also mentioning Abe's efforts at historical reconciliation I think, too. For a supposedly "nationalist" politician, who favoured a less "masochistic" view of Japan's national history, on the international scene he expended political capital to attempt a "final" settlement on the comfort women issue with Seoul - though this backfired in the end as President Moon undid the deal done with Abe by President Park (and upped the ante with reparations claims), I still believe he went the extra mile (in respect of what is politically possible for him) to mend fences with South Korea.
>
> He achieved (easier) success with the US during the Pearl Harbor visit, and especially with Australia through his visit to Darwin (site of Pearl Harbor type raids during WW2). Indeed, it was during his tenure that the Japan-Australia relationship gained the appellation "Special Strategic Partnership" and security cooperation and diplomatic alignment between these countries has flourished. In this respect, Abe contributed a lot toward making Australia a true friend of Japan, (which also reduces previous Japanese "isolation" in the broader region).
>
> Lastly, the FOIP (and the Quad/Quad plus) was a major foreign policy initiative led by Abe (and subsequntly adopted by the US) and contributed to a perception that Japan is finally playing a bigger role in the region.
>
> From our perspective down under at least he is well admired for such efforts.
>
> ~~ Thats my 2c!
>
> best to all, Tom
>
> Dr Thomas S. Wilkins
>
> Senior Research Fellow: Japan Institute for International Affairs (JIIA)
>
> Senior Lecturer: Department of Government & International Relations (GIR)
>
> Mailing address:
> 434, A02 Social Sciences Building
> Science Road, The University of Sydney NSW 2006
>
> AUSTRALIA +61 (0)2 9351 5008
>
> Associate Editor (Asia general ): Pacific Affairs
>
> Co- Area Editor (Politics): Japanese Studies
>
> NEW MONOGRAPH: "Security in the Asia Pacific": https://www.rienner.com/title/Security_in_Asia_Pacific_The_Dynamics_of_Alignment
> From: ssj-forum-bounces@iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp <ssj-forum-bounces@iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp> on behalf of SSJ-Forum Moderator <ssjmod@iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp>
> Sent: Thursday, 10 September 2020 2:47 PM
> To: ssj-forum@cal.iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp <ssj-forum@cal.iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp>
> Subject: [SSJ: 11146] Re: Abe Shinzo - what have been his most consequential domestic policy actions?
>
> From: Paul Midford <paul.midford@ntnu.no>
>
> Date: 2020/09/05
>
>
> On the question of how successful Abe was in his second term, I think it
> is a mixed bag. In some ways his biggest success was just staying in
> office for such a long period and bringing some political stability and
> sustained, albeit very low, economic growth over a long period. I also
> think his assault on the Bank of Japan´s deflationary bias was a big
> success, and shows the benefits of being out of power. I doubt Abe or
> any other LDP leader would have been able to think outside the box and
> consider taking on a major governmental institution had they not had the
> sobering experience of being voted out of power.
>
> Reinterpreting the constitution is also an important legacy, although it
> was in fact a far more modest reinterpretation than is commonly
> understood. Abe also withdrew Japan from all boots-on-the-ground SDF
> deployments overseas in support of international security, favoring a
> more isolationist approach. In many ways, his constitutional revision
> and reinterpretation projects end up looking more like inward looking
> ideological projects rather than attempts to remake Japan´s security
> policy.*
>
> I don´t think Abe made very much progress restarting Japan´s nuclear
> power plants, certainly far less than he originally intended (he wanted
> all reactors restarted by 2015). He only restarted up to 9 out of 48,
> and some of those had to shut down again to meet new anti-terror
> standards. Many reactors are being scrapped. Abe de facto took Noda´s
> policy of ending nuclear power by 2039 and extended that deadline by 10
> to 15 years. Like the consumption tax, Abe ended up implementing his
> DPJ´s predecessors' energy reform policies for promoting renewable
> energy. Abe added a hydrogen strategy on top of that, which also
> promotes renewable energy. Consequently, energy sector reform is one of
> the few areas where we saw real progress with the Third Arrow of
> Abenomics.** TPP and the EU-Japan FTA can also be counted as significant
> successes that also made some contributions to the Third Arrow, although
> again both policies originated with the DPJ. A more independent
> initiative that Abe deserves credit for (i.e. for the courage of taking
> on his conservative base) is creating a guest worker program, although
> so far the results have been miniscule.
>
> Overall, for a leader of a coalition with a two-thirds majority in the
> lower house and a stable coalition majority in the upper house (except
> for the first 8 months) over 7 years and 8 months Abe´s accomplishments
> do not seem that impressive to me. I think there are two major
> explanations for this: either Abe was not a very strong leader who got
> lucky, or he is a strong leader who made the maximum amount of change
> possible in Japan´s political system. If it is former then we can
> anticipate that a stronger leader could make bigger changes. If it is
> the latter then we should expect less change moving forward. I
> personally think it was more the former: Abe was not a strong leader who
> got lucky, but I open to the second possibility.
>
>
> Best,
> Paul
>
>
> * Here I would cite Bryce Wakefield´s chapter in a new published (7
> September) volume I co-edited on Japan´s inward looking debate on
> constitutional reform:
>
> https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/sMC_Cnx1jniVW2o0T9pCLZ?domain=amazon.com
>
>
> ** Here is another shameless plug for a new book looking at Japan´s
> energy policy in comparative perspective:
> https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/Vi50CoV1kpfmwRzNuzrqNL?domain=amazon.com
>
> 差出人: ssj-forum-bounces@iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp
> <ssj-forum-bounces@iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp> が SSJ-Forum Moderator
> <ssjmod@iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp> の代理で送信
> 送信日時: 2020年9月3日 7:36:14
> 宛先: ssj-forum@cal.iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp
> 件名: [SSJ: 11140] Re: Abe Shinzo - what have been his most consequential
> domestic policy actions?
>
> From: Ellis Krauss <eskrauss@gmail.com>
>
> Date: 2020/09/03
>
> Peter:
>
> I think you are being too harsh on Abe. What could he have done
> domestically? What were Japan's most serious problems. Crime? No?
> Violence? No. Immigration reaction? No. An aging society and massive
> debt? Yes. But he managed to get through the consumption tax increase,
> if delayed, no mean feat given internal LDP opposition and massive
> opposition in the public. He also brought back nuclear power (personally
> I don't like it but...) -- a stopgap to supply energy needs until Japan
> can diversify more.
>
> It's true that Abe's main achievements were in foreign policy but you
> confined this to domestic policy. And perhaps the main domestic
> achievement was to bring back political stability after 7 years of
> non-stability.
>
> Comparatively, what other leader of a major industrialized country even
> accomplished that much? Johnson? Trump? Don't make me laugh. Macron?
> Couldn't accomplish his needed reforms and there was instability over
> them. Maybe Merkle, but her main accomplishments were in foreign policy
> too and now she's facing a resurgent extremist right.
>
> So what were your expectations?
>
> Best,
> Ellis
> Ellis Krauss
>
>
> On Wed, Sep 2, 2020 at 21:45 SSJ-Forum Moderator
> <ssjmod@iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp> wrote:
>
> From: Peter Cave <Peter.Cave@manchester.ac.uk>
> Date: 2020/08/28
>
> Dear Forum members
>
> With PM Abe's announcement that he is stepping down, I would be
> interested to know what you consider to be his most consequential
> actions in domestic policy, excluding the actions to boost inflation and
> lower the value of the yen. I deliberately limit the question to
> domestic policy, and I exclude those particular actions, because I
> suspect that many might agree about their importance.
>
> There are various opinions about Abe, and he raises quite strong
> passions. However, given that he has enjoyed perhaps the most commanding
> parliamentary majority in the democratic world during his
> record-breaking tenure, my personal impression is that he has done
> remarkably little with it on the domestic front. I can't help feeling
> that almost any other leader of a comparable country, in a comparable
> position, would have done far more. You may agree or disagree about this
> - I look forward to hearing. But if it is a correct view, the question
> then arises, why? Various reasons could be imagined. For example, it
> could be argued that Abe was weaker than he appeared, and so could not
> do things he really wanted to do, because of divisions within the LDP,
> and the LDP's need for the alliance with Komeito. It could also be
> argued that Abe (and the LDP as a whole) is actually relatively content
> with the state of Japan, and so did not see the need for radical
> measures (this would not be surprising given that the LDP has been in
> power for the vast majority of the last 65 years, and thus has played an
> enormous role in shaping Japan as it is today).
>
> I look forward to hearing the views of Forum members.
>
> Peter
>
> Peter Cave
> Senior Lecturer in Japanese Studies
> SALC, University of Manchester
> Samuel Alexander Building
> Oxford Road
> Manchester M13 9PL
> United Kingdom
> Tel: +44 (0)161 275 3195
> https://protect-au.mimecast.com/s/1mY7Cp81lrtZwW8rcY_UIF?domain=urldefense.com