Looking at the results from yesterday's election, I have a number of thoughts.

What I looked at most closely was not whether the coalition would win a majority, but whether the DPJ would keep its position as the main opposition party.
In my view, the DPJ made significant progress in reconsolidating its position as the main opposition party, although that may in large part be due to Ishin no kai's self-inflicted wounds. Unlike last December's election the DPJ beat Ishin no kai in votes and seats in the PR section. While Ishin no kai almost matched the DPJ for seats in December this time DPJ won more than twice as many seats as Ishin.

Still, this election clearly showed continued DPJ weakness as the main opposition party, weakness most clearly reflected in the gains the JCP made. Indeed, if all the new seats gained by Ishin, Mina no tou, and the JCP had gone to the DPJ instead, Minshutou would have won 33 seats, versus the 44 it held before the election, not such a big drop. Looking forward there is reason to be skeptical about Ishin's long-term viability as a party, especially outside of Osaka (and perhaps even there). Mina no tou probably has more staying power, but it is not clear whether the party is able to expand its base of support much beyond what it has now. If the DPJ is able to revamp its image with a new leadership line-up and policies that are more clearly distinguished from those of the DPJ it should be able to begin reaggregating the non-LDP vote in 2016 and make significant gains, especially if voters are unhappy with LDP rule and start to look back at DPJ rule nostalgically.

As for the LDP, it did succeed in breaking through the 30% threshold in PR, something it failed to do last December or in last month's Tokyo assembly election.
The 35% they received is a significant improvement. On the other hand, the party failed to win a stand alone majority, and appears to lack the votes to push constitutional reform through the Upper House. That also ensures that Komeito will continue to be influential on policy.

The question most commentators have been asking is whether the coalition's majority in the Upper House will allow Abe to show his "true colors" in terms of pursuing nationalist foreign and domestic policies.
His reliance on Komeito in the Upper House will help brake that tendency, but the deeper question is whether Abe feels as free to pursue his ideological proclivities as he did in 2006-2007? The last time he was PM the LDP had never experienced being voted out of office. Having recently experienced being relegated to the opposition, the question is whether Abe thinks he can prioritize his ideological goals, or whether it is now easier for him and the LDP loosing power again the way they did in 2009? If so, then Abe will likely decide that ideology is an unaffordable luxury and holding on to power is paramount. On the other hand, Abe might decide he doesn't care about the LDP's fate in 2016 and wants to maximize his policy goals over the next three years regardless, although that would likely generate a leadership challenge within the party.

Paul Midford