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November 30, 2012

[SSJ: 7870] Re: Abe, Senkakus and the Public View of Manifesto Promises

From: Richard Katz
Date: 2012/11/30

First, a thanks to Jun Okumura for reporting that the Mainichi translation was in error, not the original Mainichi editorial. I wonder if the same is true of Asahi.

But, now that I have set up Jun with my gracious thanks, I have cleverly rendered him powerless to disagree with my reply to his comment that:


>And it's hard for a politician or
>op-ed writer to say "let's not upset the Chinese"
while offering no
>meaningful alternative when the general public mood is
running against
>the Chinese actions.


Jun is probably right that is is hard. But that doesn't mean that it's not necessary. What would be the consequences? The likely Chinese reaction? The Japanese options in light of China's reaction? Etc. Etc. Does Abe intend to tell Beijing: "don't take it so seriously; I just did it to win some votes"? That should go over well.

And, at the risk of sounding naive, why is it so hard to ask these very simple questions about "what happens next if you station personnel?"

The lack of proper debate prior to the Noda purchase of the Senkakus was an ingredient in Tokyo's widely-reported miscalculation of Chinese reaction. How come there was so little discussion in the press (at least from what I've seen) of a third option between letting Ishihara buy them or Noda buying them? That was to pressure the owner to maintain the lease he had held for so long, and up the lease rate, if necessary.

I spoke last night to an American businessman in China who said that Chinese officials asked him at the time (i.e. while the national purchase was still being discussed within
Japan) to get the US government to put pressure on Tokyo to find a way to maintain the status quo. I have no reason to believe this person was lying to me. He said the officials told him that the Chinese govt was communicating this to DC itself, as well as to Japan.

Did anyone on Noda's political team or the Gaimusho present Noda with this leasing/status quo option; if so, why was it rejected? If not, why was it not presented? Why did Noda and his advisors think that the Chinese would simply accept their purchase? Why didn't the Japanese press discuss this third option? Would things have turned out better if they had?

The Chinese in turn, from what I can tell, decided that Noda bought them, not as a lesser evil, but because he wanted to as part of Japan's rightist shift. He could easily have chosen to maintain the status quo if he really wanted to, they say. The Chinese seem inclined to see Machiavellian motives, rather than mistakes, in all sorts of moves. No one in China believed the bombing of the Chinese mission in Yugoslavia by the US was a mistake. The international relations literature suggests that nations, like individuals, are able to accept injury more readily if they believe it was inadvertant.


Richard Katz
The Oriental Economist

Approved by ssjmod at 11:17 AM