Thanks to Rick Katz for, as always, asking important and well thought out questions.

"So, here's what I'd like to throw open for discussion.
For the sake of argument, let's assume that the technological fixes are in place if there is the political will to enforce them. Do people think that the Japanese political, bureaucratic and business elite is capable of forcing the nuclear village to adopt these upgrades?"

As for nuclear regulation, I think what we have seen proves that long-term effective regulation of the nuclear power industry is not feasible. Nuclear power by its nature is too concentrated in terms of size, sunk capital, expertise, etc., and hence a very corrupting influence on the political system and hence the regulators. Also, Rick's question implies a static
answer: a one-time fix and the problem is solved. In fact, safety regulation is constant process. The nuclear industry might be forced to implement fixes today, but new fixes will be needed in the future in the face of new conditions that prevail then. If they nuclear industry suceeds in corrupting the regulators again, nuclear power will again become unsafe.

"If they did, do you think it would make any difference to the Japanese public, or has trust been so shattered that it is not recoverable regardless of any safety upgrades?"

I don't think trust in nuclear regulation can be recovered, but I do think there is a possibility that once the new safety agency comes up with new safety guidelines (as opposed to the provisional onces applied to the Oi reactors), that the public will tolerate the use of nuclear power in the short run, or at longest until the current reactors reach 40 years of age, which is what Noda's policy is assuming. Yet, it remains an open question whether the public will tolerate this, and playing up the threat of roling blackouts and shortages is unlikely to work next summer (it is also doubtful whether the new regulations and safety measures will be in place by then).

"This policy [Noda's phaseout of nuclear power] would not be legally binding unless the Diet approved a new law."

Actually, it is legally binding in the sense that the recently enacted law on nuclear safety specifies a 40 year life span for commercial reactors, and I believe they eliminated the escape clause that would have allowed for exceptions. That said, if only that law is applied there would still be some small amount of nuclear power operating into the 2040s. That said, we should note the Noda's policy, as of now, remains absurdly contradictory: fuel reprocessing will continue and METI minister Edano announced that previously licesensed new reactors could still be built.

"At the same time, the cost of abandoning nuclear power is very high, inclding more deaths due to air pollution from more fossil fuels, higher prices for fuel imports, lower GDP growth, costs of decommissioning, tons of money thrown at renewables, etc."

One uncertain factor is the extent to which Japan will rely on nuclear over the next 15 plus years. In principle, under Noda's zero nukes by the 2030s policy the answer could be somewhere up to about 25% over the next decade, in which case these impacts would be minimal. That would give plenty of time for decomissioning nuclear power plants and replacing them with renewable energy. And if Japan doesn't throw money at renewables it would have to throw that money at new nuclear power plants anyway (not to mention the question of whether throwing money at renewables might be a good strategy for promoting economic growth similar to throwing money at bullet trains or rising industries in the past).

The real problem Japan has regarding electricity is the dominance protected and bloated regional EPCOs that do not face competition; this is what drives Japan's already high electricity prices. What is badly needed is a dose of Schumpterian creative destruction in the form of competition. First, the EPCOs need to be divested of control over the grid, and the grid needs to be developed into a national grid. That will allow level competition among energy sources in Japan.
Second, and related, Japan should allow Korean and Russian electricity producers to enter the market via power lines across the Korean Straits and the Sea of Japan. Finally, Japan needs to invest a lot more in its grid, not only to make it truly national, but to make it smart, and to build in the electrical storage capacity that will be required with the widespread use of renewables (e.g. flywheel storage and hydrogen storage). Japan's real electricity crisis does not stem from a lack of suitable technology, it stems from political weakness.

Paul Midford
Norwegian University for Science and Technology