HI
I much appreciate Meg McKean's sensible discussion of the rational-choice perspective as a very flexible conception able to also accommodate cultural definitions of preferences and structural/institutional constraints.

I would be fascinated to hear how Meg would use this perspective to help us understand the Fukushima case.

Just a note on this definition of rational-choice. It causes me to think, well OK everyone has this potential for rationally weighing the alternatives and choosing what best suits their
preferences. But
doesn't this potential have to be socially-nurtured?
For example, Japanese education and employment systems, probably most would agree, discourage individuals from thinking about and acting on their own preferences.
They encourage conforming to the
institutionally-determined path. The US system in contrast emphasizes personal choice all along the way, leading to considerable floundering and seeking after graduation. As a result, in Japanese society, the making of personal rational choices on self interest must occupy much be a much weaker basis of behavior and focus of mental attention compared to the US society.
And correspondingly, in Japan, the acquiescence to institutional routine, to habit, with little effort at choice, must be higher than in the US. The definition of rational-choice seems to assume that non-choice
(habit) is a rare exception in human society. Could rational-choice really lead us to this picture of Japan as a habit-following society?

Thanks
Jeff

--
Jeffrey Broadbent
Associate Professor
Department of Sociology
Institute for Global Studies
909 Social Science Building
University of Minnesota