What a great discussion on the relation between culture and political-economic decisions!
Of course, the diversity of our views shows that the social sciences have no consensual definition of what culture is, how it acts, how to
measure it, or what it causes. The object is vague
and subtle, but
yet somehow does exist. Thinking of culture as creating motivation that then leads to behavior does not lead us to answers in the Japan case, because most Japanese chafe bitterly under their rigid institutional constraints; many would even throw them off if they could, but lack alternatives. In general, this motivational model of culture has been challenged. In some sociological circles it has been replaced or supplemented by a notion of culture "from the inside out,"
that is as behavior informally enforced by constant social pressure and habit.

If we look at culture instead as a set of relational norms that are in place and provide the only mutually-known way of life, like a common language, we may gain some traction both in theory and in the Fukushima case. Research comparing networks among organizations in Germany,the US and Japan involved in the formation of public policy (in this case, labor policy, with data collected in 1989) found that the Japanese polity is thoroughly penetrated and organized by networks of long-term reciprocity, mutual aid. In comparison, such reciprocity networks are virtually absent in the German polity and only present among labor organizations in the US polity. In the Japan case, the reciprocity networks culminate in the state agency mandated to handle this policy field, the Ministry of Labor Labor Politics Bureau. These reciprocity networks channel the flow of information.
Political contention is outside this network and centered in political parties, which are also marginal to the reciprocity network (for Japan analysis, see Broadbent, 2000, Policy Studies). The fact that so many organizations are linked to specific others in a centralized hierarchy of reciprocity quite mirrors Nakane's notion of the "vertical society"
(tate shakai). The reciprocity network pattern only
works between
acknowledged particular others; it is not generalized.
It may have its source in strongly reinforced norms of particular reciprocity, stemming back to village society. It can be called an informal institution, or a habitual framework for relating to particular recognized others. Others outside the network matter much less to decision-makers.

If we apply this model of very particular reciprocity-information networks to the Fukushima case, does it gain us any
traction? Here
is one interpretation. Up until the DPJ victory in 2009, the dominant power configuration had been the
1955 system with its ruling triad of ministry, business and LDP. Following the reciprocity network model, within this elite, the core was the ministry-business nexus that produced (socially constructed) what passed for policy-related knowledge and filtered out inconvenient information.
The nuclear
village perfectly follows this model. What Kan did as PM, storming into the Tepco offices, broke the normative channels of reciprocity-information flow. It was an assertion of political leadership highly unlikely for a PM under the old
triad. His action
illustrates how crises can inspire agency that will challenge and sometimes break old institutions. Does this hold water, folks?

Given the difference in normative relational patterns, the German and US polities would probably have produced very different channels of reaction to a crisis of this kind, perhaps leading to different outcomes. It would be useful to follow through this thought experiment, but space prohibits its development here.

If this reciprocity network model is correct, it then follows, how malleable is it to reform? The Yoshida Report from APARC at Stanford makes a number of excellent suggestions for institutional change that would reduce the chances of Japan, should it continue on the nuclear path, producing another Fukushima in the future. These include a governance change -- an independent nuclear regulatory commission, and a market change--breakup of the regional electric power monopolies to introduce full competition into the system. From the standpoint of institutional systems design to reduce risk, having more independent check points in the nuclear governance and market system as suggested would seem to be a universally-applicable fix. But as of yet, consonant with the deep structure, very few if any such independent agencies yet exist in Japan. How malleable is this system to change? Beyond the universal pressures from business organizations that do not want to be regulated and want to retain market-fixing advantages, does the deep reciprocity-information network add a lot more inertia and resistance to change? To instill beneficial institutional change, will it require special strategic thinking cognizant of the deep reciprocal structure in Japan?

Comparison to the US clarifies the differences. The US in contrast is a society of spot-contracts, of alliances of convenience, where politics make strange bed-fellows. The US Constitution enshrines the separation of powers. But even on this individualized relational field, supposedly independent regulatory agencies (i.e., SEC, NLRB,
NRC) seem to degenerate over time into capture by the businesses they are supposed to regulate. That is one reason why libertarian conservatives might oppose government regulation, it can become corrupted and ineffective. Their solution is a freer market that allows more competition, but that provides no solution to collective goods problems like nuclear meltdowns and other pollution either.

Ultimately, perhaps the only source of sufficient power to cause change lies in the Japanese people. It was only their national uprisings, blockading factories, electing reform minded politicians and instituting national lawsuits, that brought about the 1970 Pollution Diet with its far reaching restrictions on industrial pollution (Broadbent 1998). If a similarly powerful movement erupts against nuclear power, it will have the potential to bring about significant institutional reform such as proposed by the Yoshida report and beyond.

--
Jeffrey Broadbent
Associate Professor
Department of Sociology
Institute for Global Studies
909 Social Science Building
University of Minnesota