I want to thank Prof. Broadbent for his lucid comments.

As we study Japan carefully in our program, we find very often that phenomena is often blamed on culture and it is indeed the ultimate cop-out as Geral Curtis recently noted, and devoid of explanatory power.

I may also add that there is an excellent description of the events at Fukushima that are fact based and written by Dr. Kenji Kushida at APARC. They are illuminating and is extremely well written and dispassionate, although I am sure we can discuss
differing views about its conclusions. The offer a
refreshing contrast to Kurokwa's political report. You can find it here:
http://aparc.stanford.edu/publications/23762/. It is
well worth reading.

I also want to note two things that Dr. Kushida's report makes clear even though they are not emphasized in his report. First, business managers and pilots (at
least) will certainly not expect a smooth and perfect response by any organization, in any country, to a disaster. For example, the proper recovery from a spin in an airplane was developed over decades. No one would be able to invent the proper response while first encountering an actual spin. It must be anticipated, a response learned, and the response practiced. The fog of events, order plus counter-order, is common in all unpracticed emergencies is a well known and understood phenomenon. Thus, its is inappropriate and unreasonable to find fault in the confused but ultimately reasonably successful efforts in the wake of an incredible disaster. The failure, if we can find one, is more likely in the lack of anticipation of the disaster and thus no practiced responses. But that failure seems human to me - not uniquely Japanese. I challenge us to find many well known articles calling for TEPCO to prepare for a 9.2 quake and a 12 meter tsunami before the event. Notably, TEPCO's top management was not hired fight nuclear disasters but to navigate rate structures, capital formation, and consistent operation. They failed in many ways, but they are humans and we should adjust our condemnation appropriately.

Second, Dr. Kushida's report makes clear that individual operators with knowledge of the particular power-plant were contractors, not regular TEPCO employees. For years, there has been a rich commentary that reliance on contractors will have this effect - that is, the loss of operational level skills inside the firm at the critical action points. What was needed at the time were bottom level operators who knew where the emergency equipment was - not TEPCO's CEO. This is just some chickens coming home to roost. And it is true is all countries - examples abound.

Again, I congratulate Prof. Broadbent and commend Dr.
Kushida' article. Let's leave this cultural explanation cop-out far, far behind.

Best Regards,

Robert Eberhart