Incredibly, the Diet-appointed Kurokawa commission on the Fukushima nuclear disaster blamed it on Japanese culture. But only in the English translation, not in the Japanese version, which correctly called it a man-made disaster caused by, among other things, "collusion" between regulators and TEPCO, which led to a "collapse" in the watchdog functions. "There were many opportunities for taking preventive measures prior to March 11," said the report. An Asahi summary of the report (http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/social_affair
s/AJ201207060088) says:

> The final report pointed to delays
in responding to new anti-quake

> guidelines for nuclear plants in 2006. TEPCO
estimated it would
cost

> 80 billion yen ($1 billion) to construct sea barriers
and other

> reinforcements to safeguard the plant following
revised
calculations

> about the threat to the facility from earthquakes and
tsunami.

>

> But in the end, only limited steps were taken.

>

> NISA officials also did nothing, having concluded
that TEPCO was
in a

> better position to judge what important work needed
to be done and

> when.

>

> The final report also scoffed at TEPCO's argument
that the tsunami

> was so off the charts there was no way it could
anticipate a
disaster

> of that magnitude.

>

> In fact, at an April 2007 meeting between NISA and
electric power

> companies, discussion centered on the possibility of
tsunami

> exceeding all expectations striking coastal power
plants. Concern
was

> voiced about damage to reactor cores if that
happened.

>

> Those same concerns were shared at a similar meeting
the year
before

> between NISA and the utilities, while memories of the
late 2004

> tsunami disaster in the Indian Ocean were still
fresh.

>

> The Diet commission's report said the exchanges
between NISA and

> electric power companies seemingly went nowhere. It
also noted
that

> the long delays in implementing safety steps created
a host of

> problems.

>
In other words, the disaster was the result of specific, correctable errors, including the lack of wall separating regulators from regulatees, and TEPCO's refusal to heed warnings about a tsunami and to spend
$1 billion (how much of a rate increase would this have caused, and what is the cost of not having done the proper thing?).

Yet, in the English-language version, we get a different, more fatalistic picture (see .http://www.nirs.org/fukushima/naiic_report.pdf, pg. 9)

> What must be admitted - very
painfully - is that this was a disaster

> "Made in Japan." Its fundamental causes are to be
found in the

> ingrained conventions of Japanese culture: our
reflexive
obedience;

> our reluctance to question authority; our devotion to
'sticking
with

> the program'; our groupism; and our insularity.

>

> Had other Japanese been in the shoes of those who
bear
responsibility

> for this accident, the result may well have been the
same.

Gerry Curtis wrote a wonderful rebuttal to this nonsense in the Financial Times
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/6cecbfb2-c9b4-11e1-a5e2-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz20EnzZZ6K

What strikes me so much is the contrast between the cultural explanations aimed at the gaijin and the lack of them in the Japanese version. When Kurokawa spoke at the Foreign Correspondents Club, the reporters reportedly grilled him on this difference (see
http://www.shisaku.blogspot.com/) but I don't know the substance of what happened. What I also don't know is to what extent, if any, the Japanese language press has pointed to this difference. Anyone with info on this?

Richard Katz
The Oriental Economist Report