Hello, folks.


Re Paul Midford's comments:

"My point is that if it's a decision between going back to something like business as usual and no operation at all, then no operation at all is more likely to prevail than if several communities are asked to gaman for a few months to prevent a power crisis this summer."
(2012/02/28)

My point is that if it's a decision between continuing to run the power plants year-round under more stringent safety standards enforced by an independent authority, and enhanced safety measures and no operation at all, then the former is more likely to prevail, so there will be no need to ask several communities to gaman for a few months to prevent a power crisis this summer.

Let's agree that it's a matter of opinion for now.

"But that begs the question as to why the loss of these economic interests hasn't caused the plants to restart already?" (2012/02/28)

The short answer is I can't be sure. I believe that it is counterbalanced at least for now by fear, which is where not only the ongoing stress tests but also more stringent safety standards enforced by an independent authority and enhanced safety measures come in. That's work in progress, and the risk tolerance of host governments varies. As for the economic bite, only part of the tax revenue (nuclear fuel tax, if my memory serves me correctly) disappears when operations stop temporarily (and Fukui has managed to partially shield itself from that, a practice that I suspect will become more popular in other host prefectures) and the one-off hit on real estate tax revenue will come only when the un-depreciated portion of the power plant must be written off because of premature (5/6ths under Paul Midford's bimonthly summer base-load scenario?) decommissioning. As for the inspection boom, remember that the power units must be inspected as they go offline. The next round of inspections will be delayed, though, which will mean that some local economies will lose more than a year's worth of inspection bumps. But the governor has the feeling of other, less beneficent constituencies to consider, I'm sure.

"Given that large numbers of Japanese have been personally or economically affected by the Fukushima accident, politicians can assume that nuclear policy will be on the minds of voters when they next go to the polls. If the referendum movement succeeds in Kansai and Kanto, then it will likely have a direct impact on policy." (2012/02/28)

Yes, and strongly anti-nuclear voters have a choice between the Social Democratic Party or the Japan Communist Party. Mayor Hashimoto looks likely to win a lot of seats in the Kansai area if he manages to field enough candidates (they will be on their own as far as campaign financing is concerned) and he has been highly critical of nuclear power, so let's see if he can field them in Fukui. As for the referendum movements, I'll believe it when I see it.

"If I were to bet Jun Okumura lunch, it would be something like the following: Assuming no new war in the Middle East, by the end of this calendar year less than 10 reactors will have restarted with operational authorization of less than 100 days (i.e. losing the bet would mean 10 or more reactors restarting with authorization for 100 days or more). I would add that 10 or more reactors restarting with authorization of more than 100 days would represent something approaching a return to pre 3-11 normal." (2012/02/28)

That leaves a huge no-man's land where no one wins, which gives the lie to "i.e." Look, I'll take four reactors, regular schedule. Anything less, say three reactors restarted under regular one year-plus schedules with the rest of the 54 reactors on your two-month peak-load schedule, and you win.

"What has changed is the public's perception of the possibility of accident-free nuclear power, of the Japanese government's crisis management abilities, and most importantly of its ability to effectively regulate nuclear power to prevent accidents before they happen (think of all the ignored warnings regarding tsunami preparations). This shift in public attitudes is comprehensible, coherent, and arguably even a rational and essentially a reasonably reaction to the new information received over the past year." (2012/03/05)

With a small tweak or two, I can subscribe to this assessment entirely, which is why I can comfortably sign on to a five-year horizon before talk, if any, on plans for new power plants can resume. (I have no views one way or other on the ones already under construction until the new safety regime settles in.)

As for renewables-and here, I am no longer solely addressing Paul Midford's comments-Paul Scalise has laid out the requisite markers and I don't see any arguments anywhere on this thread so far that gets us there by, say, 2030. If there's anything that makes sense to me, though, it's solar farm/hydrocarbon conversion plant complexes in Saudi Arabia, since it kills two problems with one big stretch of year-round
sunshine: yield and storage. But I'm not an engineer, so I'll leave it to other people to figure out what the commercial break-even point is going to be in the next ten, twenty years.

And finally, on a point which has even less to do with Paul Midford's comments, Richard Katz (2012/03/15) when he writes:

"It doesn't help anyone reach a reasonable policy course when so many people on opposite sides play fast and loose with the facts to support their point."

Let me state for the record that I agree with him in the abstract and mostly likely in the specific.