Reply to Hiro Watanabe:

"I did not say anything like 'China collapsing'. I said that China has some problems in its political economy (which I mentioned in a previous post) and the rise of China in the sense that it will become a hegemon in East Asia may not be guaranteed."

This is splitting hairs. As I wrote, no one on this Forum can predict the future, so saying one likely scenario will not happen because another will instead is essentially meaningless. The question is what will Japan do if China's relative economic and military power continues to grow. Predicting that this won't happen is just a facile escape.

"He [Midford] has never referred to my point that emphasises the importance of a high degree of economic inter-dependence between China and Japan (and other East Asian countries)"

I didn't mention this because I don't disagree with it, and because it is not especially relevant to the issue at hand, especially to the claim that a Sino-Japanese alliance is some how "impossible."

How can Midford say that Paul Kennedy's 'The rise and fall of the great powers' and China's soft power are far from the main discussion, when we discuss the rise of China?

China's global projection of soft power is a whole topic in itself that isn't necessary to discussing Japan's alliance choices, while Kennedy's theory of imperial overstretch and decline only matters (and then only barely) if you misread him as predicting Japan's rise to hegemony.

"I don't know to whom this is addressed. I don't think anyone is suggesting that PM Noda suddenly propose a Sino-Japanese alliance out of the blue,."

"This is addressed to Midford, but I did not say anything like 'PM Noda suddenly propose a Sino-Japanese alliance'."

In that case, Watanabe's earlier claim I was responding to, namely that the very idea of a Sino-Japanese alliance would be outrageous to publics in China and Japan, is simply irrelevant.

"Also, we have to think about Japan's alliance options not in terms of the situation today, but beyond five years when China is projected to overtake the US in GDP, or when the US is no longer militarily dominant in the Western Pacific. Wishing thinking as a way to avoid these very real possibilities, i.e. by betting on China collapsing or assuming the US will always be dominant, is the intellectual equivalent of putting one's head in the sand."

"As for his comment of wishful thinking, who can say so surely China would overtake the US in GDP in five years? That depends on different factors such as real growth rate, inflation rate and currency exchange rate.
I found an Economist article with a calculator that estimates when China may overtake the US in GDP and it is clear that China's number one position in the future depends on these factors (even if it is quite possible sometime later). It is also wishful thinking to assume that China continues growing in the current rate without thinking the possibility that Chinese economic growth may be decelerated, again in part due to some problems in its political economy. Can we also say so surely that the US will no longer dominant militarily in the Western Pacific in five years?"

As I already pointed out, most economists see China's growth rate slowing from 9-10% down to 7-8% over the next few years, and then down toward 6-7%. I don't know of any economists who are predicting continued 10%+ growth for China. It is also important to note that many of the downward factors on Chinese growth stem from depressed growth outlooks in the US, Europe, and even Japan. In other words, it is relative growth that matters, and there is little indication that the relative growth gap is about to close. But the real point again is that is pointless to address one scenario by predicting an alternative reality, and in this case that is clearly wishful thinking.

We can not predict the future, we can only consider more or less likely scenarios. How will Japan respond to a rainy day? Let's assume it will be sunny instead!
Why should we be interested in what Japan will do on a sunny day? I suppose one could make a case for preparing for unexpected good fortune, but that an entirely separate question and does not negate the need to think about what to do on a rainy day.

"Again, Japan already defends itself, and as such, it is not clear why Japan would have to change Article 9 or acquire larger offensive capabilities."

"Currently, Japan defends itself 'under the US military protection' and this is very different from the situation where Japan would have to defend itself without such protection."

Except for nuclear weapons Japan's defense independent of the alliance isn't different. Read Jennifer Lind's
2004 IS article, where she demonstrates that Japan has more than enough conventional military power to defeat not only any North Korean attack, but also a Chinese attack, with Japan even capable of extending its air control over limited parts of eastern China. As for nuclear weapons, I've already discussed the pros and cons of possibly going nuclear or reducing the US-Japan alliance to a nuclear umbrella only alliance (the Hosokawa proposal).

"As an end to the US-Japan alliance would significantly improve China's security situation by parrying the potent US threat, it would have every incentive to accept Japan having a robust territorial defense, especially as Japan is no longer a candidate regional hegemon regardless of how pessimistic one wants to be about what sort of regime it might have in the future."

"...What 'evidence' can Midford have to
say that China has this incentive? Is this not an example of 'A vague characterisation is a poor substitute for a clear argument with concrete examples'?"

On the contrary, reducing the US military threat is the specific example and evidence of such an incentive.
I would add that China would continue to have that incentive so that Japan does not decide to return to the US, align with India or Russia, or engage in a unilateral military buildup.

"It is also worth noting that some Chinese foreign policy scholars are arguing that China is already becoming more accepting of a Japan with a robust defense capability (see Jianwei Wang's chapter in the new Soeya, Tadokoro and Welch volume on Japan as a Normal Country)."

"Do a majority of Chinese people and the Chinese Communist Party accept a Japan with a robust defense capability in the same way as some Chinese scholars mentioned by Midford?"

Maybe Watanabe sees China as an emerging democracy where majority opinion prevails? As for Wang's chapter, he analyzes Chinese perceptions toward Japan rather than just expressing his personal opinion.

"All of my posts have been precisely about this:
identifying some of the incentives that Japan might have to consider other alliance options, albeit without claiming that these benefits necessarily outweigh the ones Japan receives from its alliance with the US."

"I asked Midford what incentives American and Japanese political actors have in dismantling the US-Japanese alliance for the conclusion of a Sino-Japanese alliance but I have not heard of anything from him."

I answered this repeatedly in various posts on this topic, including my latest one to Rick Katz.

"The US-Japan alliance has existed since 1951 (revised in 1960) for 60 years and a number of administrative agreements and defense guidelines were concluded between these two countries to maintain this alliance even after the end of the Cold War. These agreements and guidelines have worked as an institutional framework and cannot be breached so easily only by a decision of one party."

This reminds me of an eikaiwa gakko advertisement on a subway train a couple of years ago that effectively said "we've been around for 20 years so we must be good." I am also reminded of economics research showing that banks in Japan are biased in favor of lending to older businesses as compared to younger businesses, a characteristic that stands out relative to not only the US, but also to other East Asian nations. Age and accumulating agreements don't necessarily equal a viable alliance. And as for not being easily broken, I have already agreed on that narrow point several times now.

"Even when the DPJ's Hatoyama
administration tried to achieve a relatively small thing such as relocating Futenma Airbase, it was not successful as a result of the US opposition. The US has a large stake and great interests in maintaining US bases in Japan to maintain the stability of East Asia, so it is very unlikely for the US to agree to the termination of this alliance."

Yes, the US is very dependent on Japan for its security in ways that are almost never recognized in Japan. As for the US not agreeing, they would not really have a choice. However, if Japan had a clearer understanding of US dependence, and the US did as well, or Japan made this dependence manifest, clearer thinking would prevail in Washington and it would do the wise thing (although expecting Washington to be wise might be too
optimistic) and respect Japan's wishes on the Futenma and similar issues. The result would be a strengthened alliance.

"although that would have to be balanced against the deterrence gains (just as Japan would not challenge a nuclearly armed China in territory it controls China would exercise the same restraint vis-a-vis a nuclear armed Japan, although it already largely does so anyway). Also, China would be less opposed if there was a Sino-Japanese alliance or strategic rapprochement."

"This only sounds like a Realist theoretical fiction. I wonder if Midford can show us any evidence that what he says above is likely to happen."

Evidence: How many nuclear powers have been invaded?

"I will defer to others who know Britain better than I do, although the British comparison seems a bit overly idealized. Certainly in the case of the US, right-wing violence seemingly supported by the statements of elected officials is anything but unheard of. The Oklahoma City bombing or the Branch Davidian cases were, in terms of violence, an order of magnitude larger than anything the post-war Japanese right-wing has ever carried out."

I am not idealising Britain at all, but I know that people can criticise or ridicule the Royal family even in public or mass media. I have lived in the UK for many years. This situation is very different from Japan, where people are likely to feel psychological pressure or intimidated if they try to do the same to the imperial family partly as a result of the past violence and attacks by extreme right-wings."

Ya, sure, but this is an isolated issue that has nothing to do with foreign policy, and this taboo is probably is well supported by the public anyway. Every society, including western societies, have taboo speech and people who violate taboos tend to suffer. Also, should we worry about Thai militarism because Thailand is stricter than Japan in enforcing taboos against criticizing their royal family?

Paul Midford