To Paul Midford:

A few responses to his very interesting response to Hiroaki Richard Watanabe's points:

1)I agree with Paul about military power still counting.
2)Indeed, what I think is missing from this discussion is a simple looking at what happened to the US-Japan alliance between the early 1990s and today: it has been strengthened. Why? Clearly there is among both Japanese elites and public an INCREASING perception of threat (from DPRK and China). If there was ever a time the alliance could, should, and was question it was in the early to mid-1990s because of the end of the Cold War, the Okinawa rape incident, etc. Indeed, many thought the alliance was on its last legs. Yet both the US and Japanese political elites then strove to maintain it, and in the background was the rise of China and the DPRK as a threat.
3)Surprisingly for one who sometimes stresses public opinion as a causal variable, what is also missing from Paul's post is any citing of public opinion polls about whether the Japanese public wants to maintain the alliance and whether they perceive a threat from N.
Korea and/or from China?
4)Is it not the case that the very "realism" of Japan that Paul often discusses therefore has led it to conclude that the US-Japan alliance is a better alternative than the costs of either defending oneself or becoming a satellite of China?

In my opinion, exactly the kind of debate about the relative costs and benefits of the US-Japan alliance that Paul is arguing for took place in the early-mid 1990s and it wasn't clear at all whether the alliance would be maintained over the short or long-run. But after 1995 both the Japanese publics and political elites came to the conclusion it was worth the costs (clearly the exception is Okinawans who would conclude the opposite) rather than a)defend themselves, possibly including nuclear weapons or b)become a satellite of China in the context of a rising China and threatening DPRK.

Best regards,
Ellis