Replies in a discussion forum ought to be ping-pong, so apologies for not replying before to Jun Okumura's reservations about my notion that it would be a good thing for Japan to play the lead role in drawing up a universal nuclear control system based on prearranged mutually assured destruction, and necessarily, as a consequence withdrawing both from its military alliance with the USA and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
His main worry is the instability that would ensue in the interim period with:
"everybody rushing to own their own nuclear arms .....
> Unless you can put an end to war itself, won't there
will always be
> the temptation to avail oneself of the weapon of last
resort?
> Anticipating such thoughts, the other side... and so
on unless every
> state has second-strike capabilities"
There wouldn't be such a rush if the nuclear control regime were an international regime in which every country had, say at least three, nuclear guarantors who promise to provide the realiating second strike if it were attacked. At the moment, the two places where, in spite of NPT, nuclear arms pose a realistic threat to peace are India / Pakistan and Iran/Israel. (I discount Russia/USA with the 1500 warheads they each absurdly get to keep even if the New START is ratified,) If, for example, under a new treaty, US, Russia and China were to promise, say 5, retaliating bombs for any that India launches against Pakistan or vice versa, there would be fewer chances of escalating bombastic threats.
The relation between Iran, which at present could have all its cities destroyed by Israel while Israel suffered only a few rockets from Gaza, would become more balanced.
Once one starts thinking outside the box, there are all sorts of possibilities. I do get the impression, though, that thinking ouside the box, is frowned on in Japan and really quite rare, even compared with China where such thinking is far more dangerous. I'm glad to have allies in Aurelia George and Paul Midford who can help to stir things up.

Ronald Dore