Just a quick and belated response to Ellis. Two points
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First, in the DPJ, thanks largely to Ozawa, party endorsements have been centralised in the secretary-general's office as has the management of 'petitions' from local politicians and lobby groups (which are transmitted via the DPJ prefectural federations). This means that the requests for largesse from the central government bypass the local Diet member just as they bypass the bureaucrats, who used to be on the receiving end of the petitions from local politicians/groups etc. (mediated by Diet members from that district). This party centralisation process has put a big dent in bureaucratic power and also in the ability of Diet members from the district to gain votes by exerting their influence over discretionary bureaucratic decision-making. The centralisation process has also put enormous power into the hands of the secretary-general's office when it comes to the allocation of party funds.

Secondly, I think there are socio-economic cleavages opening up in Japan: between young and old, and between regional and city - these are not class differences so much as geographic and age-related. For example, there is a huge gulf between the young urban job-seeker and the old workers in traditional industries in rural areas. They are like chalk and cheese - and their economic interests conflict directly - in relation to trade liberalisation for instance. Where will the new jobs come from if Japanese industries move offshore?

Best wishes,

Aurelia George Mulgan
UNSW, Canberra