To Richard Katz's questions:

1) What is the incentive for the LDP to cooperate with the DPJ rather than try to force an early election, as long as the polls continue to show that gridlock is hurting the DPJ more than the LDP? We'll see how long Noda's initial bounce lasts? Tanigaki keeps talking about trying to force an early election.

ESK: Tanigaki has been trying to force an election since the DPJ came to power. Nothing new. It's about the only "strategy" and "policy" the LDP seems to have after losing power. There is no incentive for the DPJ to call an election before time gets closer to the deadline. If the DPJ is unpopular and the gridlock is hurting them more than the LDP, the rational thing is to wait and hope and try to raise that popularity either with the current PM or one they substitute later right before election.

2) What is the incentive for the LDP (or DPJ Diet
members) to support a hike in the consumption tax prior to an LH election? We see how well that worked for the DPJ in 2009 (not to mention the LDP in 1989 and 1998)
ESK: Several in LDP have always supported the consumption tax. Better to cooperate with the DPJ and let them raise it and take responsibility for it than to wait until they take power and have to do it.
Everyone knows (except maybe Ozawa?) that raising it (and a lot more than has been discussed too!) is inevitable. They're just waiting for the political cover and intra and inter- party consensus on when to do it.

Could it be that Kan was angry at Maehara for helping to force him out?
ESK: Not sure. But do know that Ozawa and Maehara are "dog and monkey"--they really dislike each other, politically and personally. So by not giving Maehara a cabinet post (and it may have been too early after Maehara's contribution scandal anyway), Noda keeps intra-party peace.

The DPJ has a genuine dilemma in that the LDP has proved it can successfully prevent the DPJ from governing, so that the DPJ keeps asking for cooperation. They are the one in the position of begging.

ESK: Yep. The LDP is playing the Repuglican strategy in the U.S.: obstruct everything, compromise on nothing, and let the other guy take the blame for the gridlock.
As in the U.S. maybe it's because they can't stand being out of power and also don't have anything else--no real policy alternatives that are rational in the modern world?
Best regards,
Ellis
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Ellis S. Krauss, Professor,
School of International Relations and Pacific Studies University of California, San Diego