"NBR has just released a new Q&A with Richard J.
Samuels (MIT) that gives insight into the DPJ's political strategy and the challenges the next administration will face after Prime Minister Kan steps down."
The following is the substance of one brief email (first line) and a much longer one (the remainder) that I sent in response to a friend in Washington, who sent me the NBR link. I significantly edited one segment-I can be snarky (okay, extremely snarky) in private-and substituted <> for bold type but otherwise left things as I originally drafted them. The emails were written before Maehara decided to step up.

***************************************

He's always interesting to read.

I had a few thoughts as I read it. Here they are. Where I do not comment, I either agree or do not have any counterarguments to offer.



I agree with much of his analysis here. However:



I'll take his word that the DPJ is among the most fractious of the world's ruling parties. But is the reason for this the lack of a common ground between the center and left? Who does he mean by center and left, and what are the policy issues that he's talking about?
By my understanding of what he means by "menagerie,"
it's a political, not a policy, one. So I have reservations with the following thought:

<"They turned him into a lame duck and may have rendered the party itself nonviable.">

It's nothing that power-sharing (Ozawa and his minions) and ego-stroking (Nishioka) can't paper over. The flap over the gasoline tax (as well as the attempt at a grand coalition during the Fukuda administration) shows that Ozawa can be quite flexible on policy if he thinks it's politically provident to do so. He's the only DPJ member with the power to wreck the party, and he won't do so on policy issues. And what are the chances of another prime minister as spectacularly bad at leading an administration as Hatoyama and Kan being confronted with a challenge of the magnitude of 3.11?



I agree with most of his analysis regarding the backdrop, although the following sentence seems a little too definitive:

<"This battle has now been joined, and we will have to wait to see whose villains and whose heroes will prevail.>

Has "the battle" really "been joined"? After all, he himself says:

<"But it is too soon to know what sort of change, if any at all, will occur.">

But that's a minor quibble.

<"After March 11, it has had to cede even more ground, particularly in social policy, where the opposition forced the DPJ to abandon its program of allowances for children and high school tuition subventions. One also gets the sense that many party leaders, though perhaps not the prime minister himself, have realized they went too far in rejecting the assistance of career bureaucrats.">

Error of fact: it's the toll-free highway that the DPJ has more or less given up on--although the DPJ was already trending in that direction because of budgetary constraints. I'm betting that the high school tuition subvention will survive, possibly somewhat altered to accommodate any Komeito wishes. As for the assistance of bureaucrats, Kan was very much open to METI support on the growth strategy, but turned against it in the wake of the nuclear disaster and its NISA fallout. As such, it is incorrect to place this within the broader narrative regarding a revision of the role of the bureaucracy in the decision-making process in the light of the experience of the two years in power.



<"He could have used nuclear power much as former prime minister Koizumi Junichiro used postal reform to sustain his power.">

This is based on a false analogy. For starters, any narrative that doesn't include natural gas is false.
And his subsequent talk about the circumstances of Yosano and Kaieda's opposition shows that he hasn't been following the details of the debate very closely.

There's some sloppiness around the policy remake agenda and its public reception as well. There's not much controversy about the overall flow of the public debate there, but he does not appear to be familiar with the underlying subject: energy.

There are a number of foreign policy issues-one example being the U.S. base relocation in Okinawa-that have not been resolved since the DPJ came to power in 2009. What changes can we expect to see to the DPJ's foreign policy strategy with a new prime minister?
"Perhaps the best one can hope for is a new prime minister with fresh ideas about relocating the Marines."

If only it were about ideas, as he recognizes immediately after. Other than that, I agree with what he says here. I think that time will tell that the McCain-Levin-Webb idea has some legs though. I'm surprised that he didn't mention it.



<"But there are also some younger stars, such as Hosono Goshi, who distinguished themselves in managing the March 11 crisis and may soon eclipse their elders.">

Who? Name names. And who says that Hosono distinguished himself (and more importantly in the media spotlight)?
In fact, he has been one of the major disappointments as far as I'm concerned, because of the high expectations that I had for him. He certainly has the gift of the gab, but I haven't seen a seize-the-bullhorn moment or any instance of being ahead of the curve out of him in the long-running series of mini-disasters, avoidable and un-.

"Indeed, the catastrophe reminded us that political leaders sometimes emerge from the crucible of crisis."

Or not. Perhaps he has Edano in mind. He certainly shone as government spokesman, although he mysteriously escaped blame for the sub-par post-disaster crisis management. I mean, isn't management the chief cabinet secretary's main responsibility? For all I know, maybe no one could have done it better. And he certainly looked reassuring. Which says a lot about how we humans recognize leadership.

As for his point about the fractious effect of collaborating with the LDP, I think that much of the policy noise will subside once more Ozawa loyalists are brought on board in the new administration. Besides, the key to success (from the DPJ's viewpoint of course) requires collaboration with the Komeito but not necessarily with the LDP. It's simple upper house arithmetic, plus a natural policy affinity. I'm surprised that he missed this. Also note that policy paralysis as the result of political gridlock can also be fatal for the DPJ. So yes, it's Scylla and Charybdis, wolf and tiger. But that's a different story.

On Tue, Aug 23, 2011 at 1:43 PM, SSJ-Forum Moderator wrote:
From: Tracy Timmons-Gray (ttimmonsgray@nbr.org)
Date: 2011/08/20

NBR has just released a new Q&A with Richard J. Samuels
(MIT) that gives insight into the DPJ's political strategy and the challenges the next administration will face after Prime Minister Kan steps down. A link to the Q&A and a summary are below.

"Japan After Kan: Implications for the DPJ's Political Future"

Q&A with Richard J. Samuels, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Link: http://m.nbr.org/o1mOoP

SUMMARY

In the face of record-low approval ratings and continuing public backlash regarding his performance following the March 2011 Tohoku earthquake, Prime Minister Naoto Kan has agreed to step down after three key pieces of legislation pass through the Japanese Diet.

Although Kan's resignation may assist the Democratic Party of Japan
(DPJ) in rebuilding public trust in its ability to lead, questions remain about the future of the DPJ and the political structure of Japan as it stands today.

In an interview with NBR, Richard J. Samuels (Massachusetts Institute of
Technology) provides insight into the DPJ, its political strategy, and who may step up to be Japan's next leader.

Read the full interview to learn the answers to these
questions:

- How has the March 2011 earthquake affected the DPJ?

- Who are the viable candidates to lead the next administration?

- In the wake of the Fukushima disaster, what is Kan's energy policy agenda and how will it change following his departure?

Read now: http://m.nbr.org/o1mOoP

Tracy Timmons-Gray
The National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) Seattle, WA