In response to Peter Caves' questions and Ellis'
answers:

>> Why has the DPJ proved so incompetent in government?

The DPJ proved itself initially quite competent in government with a lot of new policy initiatives and some key structural changes to the policymaking system (eg. abolishing the PARC) in the direction of cabinet-centred government until :-

a) the Hatoyama-Ozawa resignations - and all the associated issues around those resignations. Hatoyama may have proved to be a spectacularly incompetent prime minister, particularly with respect to Futenma, but that is not without precedent in Japan even under the long-term rule of the LDP and, of course, Ozawa was dogged once more by 'politics and money' issues. More importantly, since last June-September, the Kan administration has been under virtual siege from Ozawa and his group/cohort/faction because of Kan's 'datsu Ozawa' line. Ozawa is playing exactly the same (extreme
anti-mainstreamist) role that he did in 1992-1993 in the LDP - namely working/incessantly plotting against the incumbent administration of his own party, except this time, he does not have the power to bring down the government by leaving and at least one of his moves ended in a complete farce (i.e. the failed no-confidence motion). You have to give Kan (and the anti-Ozawa group in his administration including Sengoku, Edano, Okada and previously Maehara) credit for one no mean achievement: they managed to exclude Ozawa from any position of power - not an easy thing to do and, of course, the Kan administration has paid the price. All this 'sabotage from within' and internal DPJ politiking has taken its toll.

b) the Kan administration faced the nejire kokkai after the UH elections. There is no doubt that Kan fluffed the 2010 UH elections with his foolish talk of raising the consumption tax, but there were other larger causes of the DPJ's electoral losses - the DPJ had not honoured some of its manifesto promises and then there was the sheer incompetence of the Hatoyama administration and Ozawa's politics and money problems, mentioned earlier). As Ellis points out, the DPJ was being held to an extremely high standard of performance and it hadn't delivered quickly enough. And being in opposition has brought out the worst in the LDP as Ellis also points out. In my view, the LDP doesn't know how to behave as a 'loyal opposition' (lack of practice?), meaning that it respects the rules of the political game and while holding the government to account, does not attempt to frustrate the very possibility of government, but bides its time until the next electoral competition. It has behaved like a destructive opposition determined to bring down the Kan government at any price. The opposition of (loyal) opposition parties is normally tempered by the expectation that they will return to power one day and want to maintain conventions that allow majority parties to govern effectively. Sometimes long-serving governments, like the LDP, do not accept the legitimacy of their opponent's victory, considering themselves justified in scheming to return to the normal dispensation by any means and as soon as possible for the supposed 'good of the country'. In other words, they think they have a 'divine right to rule'. We have sometimes had that problem here in Australia with the conservative side of politics (e.g. when the Whitlam government came to power)

>>Without one party in control of both Houses,
effective policymaking is impossible.

The Kan administration's lack of a two-thirds majority in the Lower House obstacle was not an insurmountable obstacle were it not for the machinations of the Ozawa group, who made the prospect of legislative coalitions with one or more minor parties insufficient to bring the DPJ over the 2/3 line. This would be normal practice, and has been the norm in Australia for over 50 years (where the majority party in the HofReps does not have a majority in the Senate). The LDP faced the same nejire kokkai situation itself between 2007 and 2009, but had the advantage of that 2/3 majority in the Lower House, so it could use the override.

>>Is it (a) an inevitable consequence of its lack of
cohesion around any
>>ideology, set of policies, or
political principles?

Partly. The DPJ reflects its (historical and recent) origins as a party taking politicians from the right, left and centre on all issues (from defence to economic policy); it's a hodgepodge ideologically speaking. At the same time, partly as a result of the former, but also as a result of internal politiking - more often than not led by Ozawa - the DPJ government has found itself unable to contain internal divisions on policy measures, including the issue of honouring its manifesto.

>>Elections take place at very short intervals given
this structure, are
>>likely to produce somewhat different outcomes,

Agree, but Japanese elections do not necessarily always have to take place at short intervals - half the Upper House every three years, plus a maximum of four in the Lower House (e.g. 2005-2009 and possibly 2009-2013 with a double election if Kan has his way).

>> I can't say that I feel very optimistic about any
change for the better. ESK: I've become pretty pessimistic too for the next 5-10 years.

I think perhaps the most depressing aspect is DPJ regression in areas such as party participation in policymaking with the revival of the PARC, the reversion of ministers to their previous role as 'representatives of the ministries', the incomplete subordination of the bureaucracy to cabinet decisionmaking, the dysfunctional and ineffective cabinet committees, and the now largely-defunct National Strategy Office/National Strategy Bureau, which have gone nowhere. That is, all the important structural changes to the policymaking system that we thought would happen under the DPJ to make Japan a well functioning parliamentary cabinet system seem to have fallen by the wayside.

Ellis holds out the hope of another Koizumi-like figure emerging, but who? No one sets one's spirits on fire.
And then, there's the endless Ozawa machinations unless he's in a position of ultimately authority over party/policymaking - you name it. What a battle Kan has had on all sides (sabotaged from within, under siege from without), and what a failure as a leader he's proved to be. He seems to be giving full vent to his
(ira-Kan) personality characteristics, which, along with his stubborn refusal to leave office, are managing to alienate just about everyone. He'll become famous as 'the prime minister who wouldn't go', not exactly how he would wish to be remembered by history.

>> We may well look back on this period as the defining
moment when Japan gave up its leadership in Asia
(prematurely) to China, and simultaneously the moment when China began to take over global leadership from the U.S.

You said it Ellis, once again a case of 'Nero fiddling while Rome burns'.

Aurelia George Mulgan
UNSW, Canberra,
Australia