Why have Prime Minister Kan, the DPJ, and the Japanese government performed so miserably? First, we must question the premise: have Kan, the DPJ and the Japanese political system really performed as badly as people think? The relatively limited number of building collapses after the tremendous earthquake in the Northeast confirmed that Japanese construction standards are rigorous and widely enforced. The handling of refugees and building of temporary housing after the earthquake was, by international standards and considering the scope of the disaster, swift and effective. The DPJ is making strenuous efforts to fund the reconstruction efforts in a financially responsible way, including cutting back on many of its most cherished goals from the 2009 electoral manifesto, such as allowances to families with young children.

To be sure, the response of Kan and his government to the Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant disaster was bumbling and ineffective. But a major reason was Kan's distrust of the "nuclear village" left over from the days of LDP hegemony-and as events have shown, he was quite right to be distrustful. Similarly, Japan's fiscal mess, which creates huge constraints for any prime minister, is largely inherited from the "old" LDP of the period up to 2001.

Even the Japanese version of divided government (nejire kokkai), which leads to constant squabbling and makes Kan-like his immediate predecessors from both the LDP and the DPJ-look feeble, is not always an insurmountable barrier to policy cooperation, unlike the case at the moment in certain other countries we could mention. Nor is ideological diversity (which, as others have noted, is to some extent inevitable in a largely two-party system) and the lack of ideological distance between the major parties always a bad thing: a bill for handicapped people just passed the relevant upper house committee, for example, and is expected to pass the Diet soon, as is an alternative energy bill. The major parties have reached agreement on the need to increase the consumption tax, and are just looking for a good time to pass it.

Moreover, even the problems with the "nejire kokkai" could be ameliorated to some extent. As usual, Ellis Krauss identifies the key problem: the variety of electoral systems and especially the frequency of elections. Some of this is rooted in the constitution and virtually impossible to change: for example, unlike Australia-another one of the relatively few parliamentary countries with a powerful upper house-Japan does not have constitutional provisions for double dissolution elections (for decades, Australia has conducted "same day" elections covering both the lower and upper houses). But three other factors could be improved: the leading parties could eliminate internal elections for party leader, a step the DPJ reportedly is already considering. The timing of local elections could be adjusted. And political leaders could aim at more "same day elections." When Prime Minister Kan suggested this possibility the other day, it was shrugged off as little more than an excuse for Kan and the DPJ to hold on to their majority as long as possible. And maybe that was the motivation-but that doesn't mean that it was not a good idea.

Of course, these are depressing times in Japan, and Kan's erratic behavior has done little to restore confidence. But the Japanese parties and the political system are not quite as broken as everyone seems to think. They face daunting problems, many of them left over from the old LDP regime, in a context of declining population and chronically low growth. But that doesn't mean that they aren't learning, adjusting and even passing some reasonable legislation.

Gregory W. Noble
Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo