Hey, someone told me there was this "deep philosophical dorm-room discussion" going on and it's a Friday night, so where's the beer; I'll buy the pizza...

..

*sigh*

Oh well, as long as I'm here, my comments below. But first, I gotta I call mom. Seriously.

Okay, mission accomplished.

"So the first question. Why has the DPJ proved so incompetent in government? Is it (a) an inevitable consequence of its lack of cohesion around any ideology, set of policies, or political principles? (b) the result of an inadequate internal power and policymaking structure? (c) a contingent outcome of the regrettable existence of certain powerful and destructive individuals within its ranks? (d) a mixture of all three? (e) Other (fill in the blank)?"

I'm tempted to go on and on about all three points, but I'll confine myself to asking this question: What if the DPJ had won the 2005 lower house election? You're looking at a different, more manageable manifesto, a couple of more years of export-driven growth before the sub-primes hit the fan, and five more years of nuclear disaster-free energy policy. Plus, no need to suck up to two micro-parties with policy agendas deeply inimical to core DPJ policies and DPJ rookies owning nothing to Ozawa. No, it didn't happen, and an Okada (or Kan) administration could have got it wrong anyway, but you have to wonder. After all, most political observers got it wrong when Koizumi called the snap election. It's relatively easy to predict the past based on what we think that we know today-for which we can thank for all those history books-but there's a plausible case to be made for the role of luck in the perception of "incompetence" if you apply the word to the DPJ as a whole.

"Second question (linked to the first). Is there a realistic prospect of the DPJ improving its competence?
Why/why not?"

I'll limit myself to public communication, where I believe that the rules of public communication in politics have changed significantly over the years. I am not qualified to go into the details, but Yukan Fuji, Flash and Focus, and 2 Channel immediately come to mind as three game changers. It's the difference between JFK and zippergate and Weinergate. The DPJ certainly accelerated the process by challenging the MSM news cartel (aka kisha club), and Kan brought further grief on himself by cutting back on regular press conferences and all but eliminating the informal twice-a-day, corridor cling-ons. But more fundamentally, it's the difference between soap opera and reality show, vaudeville and inprov comedy. Ozawa, Hatoyama, and Kan, like fellow sexagenarians Tanigaki and Tadamori Oshima on the recto page, are by temperament or training ill-equipped to play this game; Edano, Hosno, and Ichita Yamamoto do. I see this as a significant contributing factor in the unpopularity and short shelf-life of the two DPJ prime ministers as well as the deep antipathy towards Ozawa among a large part of the Japanese electorate.

"Third question. Is there a reasonable prospect in the foreseeable future of a relatively strong government that can last for several years and carry out its political programme? Why/why not? If not, to what extent is this due to the failings of the DPJ and LDP, and to what extent is it due to the inherent problems of the current constitutional arrangements (i.e. the prospect of endless 'nejire kokkai')?"

Is there any country other than Japan and China where any politician under 60 is seen as someone whose best years have yet to come? I sometimes despair. But then, you never know what's around the corner. I'm telling you, the grass is very, very dry.