I think Earl Kinmonth convincingly demonstrated why we should not take Terril Jones' journalism seriously, at least as concerns Japan. I would add that I do not take seriously a story that has only source. Given that humans in general, not just Japanese, tend to have differing Roshomon like memories of the same event, I would think you would need at least three sources to have any certainty.

The article was also vague. It did not make clear whether steam and smoke continued, or only happened initially. Especially if it was the former, but even arguably the later, in most circumstances radiation testing would make sense for the sake of the worker, others, and the environment. If they had been exposed then you would want to take steps to remove the radioactive particles for the sake of their health. Moreover, if you them leave without testing or without cleaning steps they could spread the radioactive particles they picked to the environment and others outside, including to their families.

When we add in the hindsight of knowing that a tsunami was on its way, and that it would top the tsunami wall at the plant, testing easily looks like a big mistake. Right after the earthquake, and with no electricity, did they know the power of the quake, or that a tsunami was on its way, or that it would be so high? Did they have access to radio, etc.? Unclear. The initial estimates of the quake and tsunami were significantly smaller than what we now know. Finally, the TEPCO folks had the misplaced confidence about their tsunami wall based on their out of date estimates about possible tsunami size, and of course they had been through quakes and tsunami warnings many times before which undoubtedly added to their misplaced confidence. Bad decisions based on bad information, confusion, panic, yes. Criminal intent: no reason to think so. Even criminal negligence would seem to be a very hard case to make.

Although it's obvious that TEPCO has a very troubled organizational culture in many ways, conservative adherence to Standard Operating Procedures is something you want from an organization when it comes to nuclear health and safety issues. Ideally, of course, we want an organization that is conservative about health and safety procedures, but has leaders who are capable of instant seat-of-the-pants initiative and good judgment, but it's hard to have both. Encourage too much initiative and on-the-fly decision-making and you might get decisions that endanger worker health or even cause a nuclear accident.

If there's room for criminal negligence, it would be TEPCO's apparent willful ignorance of research suggesting a higher than expected tsunami, a tendency to hide operating and safety problems, and an unwillingness to invest in upgrading safety. The regulators who extended the operating license for the number one reactor at the plant for another ten years in February also deserve blame for not demanding more of TEPCO in exchange for the extension. I would like to hope that Kan and the DPJ, which has been much more skeptical of nuclear power than the LDP, will split off the nuclear regulators into a new independent agency and will nationalize TEPCO temporarily and clean out its leadership. They need executives from outside to fix the company's organizational culture.

Paul Midford