Not having the read the book yet, two quite simple questions come to mind about
the logic of Ramseyer & Rosenbluth's book from reading Robert Pekkanen's
excellent summary.

(1) If "imperial bureaucrats answered to, in turn, the oligarchs, the party
politicians, and the military, as their masters," as summarized by Ro bert
Pekkanen, why could not the political parties place the military under control?

If the dominance of political parties was seen after Yamagata's demise (1922)
why could not the parties become the principles of the military, like the
imperial bureaucracy and the judiciary? Furthermore, to what extent did
Yamagata's control over the military extend to the Navy? Surely they had time to
do so.

(2) Common wisdom in Japanese history, I think, claims that the parties were for
a short period able to "politicize" the military (especially under Tanaka Giichi
and Ugaki Kazushige). What accounts for the party's loss of control over the
Imperial bureaucracy? The flip side of this coin is, if the military was able to
replace the parties as masters of the bureaucracy, how was this possible?

These questions might not contradict Ramseyer & Rosenbluth's argument that the
Meiji Constitution was dysfunctional. But then, would that view be different
from that of mainstream Japanese political history? See, for example, the works
of Mitani Taichiro (Professor of Japanese Political History, Tokyo University
Law School) --- especially his short essay in Nakamura Takafusa et al eds.,
Kindai Nihon Kenkyu Nyumon, Tokyo Daigaku Shuppan kai (1980?, Second ed. 1985)

If these questions are addressed in the book there is no need to reply (I'll get
hold of a copy sooner or later). But if not, I hope this provides an opening for
a discussion.

Nobuhiro Hiwatari