Although I appreciate the way the moderators have responded to Mr. Ross's rather
strong language, I am not entirely convinced if the question raised by Mr.
Harrisson can be answered by a discussion on the media and how it forms public
perception of political environment. I don't agree with the Daily Mirror or the
Sun, but just calling it another case of racism against the Japanese won't
really explain the situation. British indignation against Japanese war crimes
may well carry prejudice as well as historical truth. The Japanese government,
however, has done little that might have induced the British people to change
their perceptions: a lot in propaganda pleading others to "understand" the
Japanese, but little in breaking away from the past by constituting a new form
of political institutions.

This surely is a question of the accountability of the Japanese government: the
interesting point is that the accountability of this government is more
challenged by those outside rather than inside Japan.
Why do we hear little from the Japanese themselves on the nature of our
government right now? This, of course, may be a consequence brought out by the
rather meek character of the Japanese media, a point Mr. Krauss has rightly
pointed out. But is that all?

Would it be that the Japanese public will become more critical of their
government if we had a CNN or a Washington Post in Japan? I find this quite
dubious; the decline of political discourse in Japan, I think, demands a more
comprehensive soul-searching than that.

One thing I had in mind when I said "political discourse" was the way the
Japanese handled the `constitutional moment,' to quote Bruce Ackerman, after the
war: how we constructed a new political institution based on a break from the
past in Japan. If we did do any of that, that is. The 'constitutional moment'
that may ferment the political process and institutions in the decades that
follow is, on the whole, a very brief period in history, but how that moment is
utilized or used up will
have profound consequences in the years to follow.

The Japanese case is not encouraging. In spite of all that has been said about
Nihonkoku Kenpo, or the constitution after the war, it was undeniably drafted by
the occupation forces, with limited attention given from the general public. The
legacy of Sengo Keimo, or "post-war enlightenment," in our political discourse
at the moment is practically nill. I understand that the constitution debate has
become a boring topic among Japanese intellectuals nowadays, and any discussion
of "post-war enlightenment" period would be dismissed as antiquarianism. One can
discuss Japanese political institutions will little or no reference to the
constitution. I'm not trying to deplore the demise of post-war liberalism here,
for there has been too much of that. What interests me is why.

Although I disagree with Mr. Ross's sweeping arguments about Japanese attitudes
towards non-Japanese, for a Japanese can be as varied as an American or an
Englishman, I still think Japanese reactions to the war crime issue this year
was characterized by nationalistic outbursts rather than liberal responses.
Hiroshima was, to the best of my knowledge, not something for a Japanese to
demand apologies from the American government: it was to be a symbol for
constructing a nuclear-free world.

An idealistic dream, yes, but the dream was supported by the tragic realities of
total destruction of two cities. As should be well-known, this liberal agenda
was reduced into domestic political consumption, where the opposition parties
could not win the government, but could still receive at least a third of the
seats in the parliament. The peace
issue, the cornerstone of post-war liberalism, was consumed as a tool for a
dying party (the Socialists, of course) to remain in the political
scene as a pressure group. By this token, what could have become a
constitutional moment in our history ended up in domestic consumption of
partisan politics.

This year it was as if we were supposed to shout Hiroshima against any American
who says Pearl Harbor, as seen in Mr. Hashimoto's reference to Hiroshima. I find
this deplorable. I must also quickly add that I also find American responses to,
for example, the Smithsonian issue, terribly
self-righteous and deplorable as well. How did we (and, perhaps the Americans),
end up in such decadent self-congratulatory nationalism?

I understand that the issues I am raising is not a topic you might choose for a
dissertation, but I still believe that discussions on the fate of secular
liberalism is essential in our understanding of the Zeitgeist that we face.

Kiichi