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From: "R.F.W.Drifte"

Japan's foreign policy in the 1990s: From economic superpower to what power?

By Reinhard Drifte.

Forthcoming (Spring 1996) by Macmillan.

Chapter titles and draft of part of introduction. (footnotes not included)

CONTENTS
Introduction
Chapter 1 The political and economic framework of Japan's foreign policy Chapter
2 The international environment and Japan's hard power Chapter 3 The use of
softpower in Japan's foreign relations Chapter 4 Japan as a cultural superpower?

Draft of part of introduction

Since 1989 the external and internal environment of Japan has been changing
considerably. Although rather belatedly in comparison to the more spectacular
and instantaneous events in Europe, the end of the Cold War has now become
palpable in East Asia as well. Without the end of the superpower confrontation
the outside involvement in the Cambodian war could not have been ended. Russia
is at present no longer a major concern for East Asia. On the other hand, the
degree of American support and involvement in Pacific Asia has also become less
credible. Conflicts which had been controlled until recently by the superpowers
have now become more open and the emergence of regional hegemons cannot be
excluded. Power is daily becoming more diffuse. As a result Japan's shadow looms
larger than ever and the country has to find new ways of securing its national
interests in an increasingly volatile and complex environment. Japan is
increasingly willing to act as a major power as this quote by the former Vice
Foreign Minister Kuriyama Takakazu shows:

For medium and small countries, the international order is basically a given
framework; their diplomatic goals should be to best adapt themselves to the
existing order, thereby protecting their security and preserving their economic
interests...Postwar Japan, using such passive diplomacy and maximally utilising
the international order supported by the United States, enjoyed peace and
prosperity...But today's Japan [with its economic power] should participate more
positively in international efforts to create a new order, thereby achieving its
own scurity and prosperity. In this sense, Japan's diplomacy should transform
itself from that of medium and small countries into that of a big country
[taikoku].1

At the same time the long rule of one single conservative party, the Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP) came to an end in 1993 and the country is almost
completely absorbed by the search for a new domestic political constellation. In
addition Japan is facing a real economic crisis which is much more structural
than the previous oil crises in 1973 and 1979. The Great Hanshin earthquake in
Kobe on the 17 January 1995 has not only emphasized the economic concerns and
the country's geological vulnerability, but more importantly may have
demonstrated the weakness of Japan's crisis management. The Gulf War in 1990-91
had laid bare Japan's inability to cope in sufficient time with a major foreign
policy crisis.

The urgency to understand Japan's foreign policy

While a time of dramatic change and apparent weaknesses could be considered the
worst moment to write a book on Japan's foreign policy, let alone about Japan's
power, one can also argue that it is the most interesting and most important
time to do so. The present political and economic turmoil only reinforces the
underlying assumption of this book that Japan matters more and more to other
countries and that it is increasingly using its economic power to influence the
options and power resources of international players. Japan is not the only
major power which is affected by recession. The way Japan copes with the
economic downturn illustrates Japan's resilience and intrinsic strength.
Although a new domestic political constellation has not yet been found, external
circumstances and the strife for power within Japan drive Japan towards greater
assertiveness and more transformation of economic power into political, military
and even cultural power. As we will see Japan's weight in world politics is now
so big that doing nothing, either inten-tionally or because of an inability to
make a decision or because of absorp- tion with other issues, can have a very
material effect on other countries. More ominously, inaction can have the effect
of narrowing Japan's range of options and predetermine future decisions of Japan
which may be then even more forceful or unwelcome for others.

Although the issue of Japan as an economic challenge is still the highest on the
Japan agenda of most countries, the end of the Cold War and the accompanying
uncertainties of the transition to a ne w period which has been called 'post
international politics' makes a better understanding of Japan's power more
urgent.2 Economic power seems to have become more important than military power
as Samuel Huntington expressed it in the following stark terms:'It is, indeed,
probably the most important source of power and, in a world in which military
conflict between major states is unlikely, economic power will be increasingly
important in determining the primacy or subordination of states.'3 Whatever the
new world order will look like, Japan with its economic and technological
foundation w ill be an important actor in it and it is therefore crucial to gain
a better understanding of the major factors involved in Japan's relationship
with the outside world. Due to its positive and negative dynamics, global
interdependence has the double effect of defusing and enhancing opportunities
for the exercize of Japan's power. The diffusion of power has led to the fact
that more complex coalitions of state and non-state actors affect outcomes.4 The
nation state paradigm is not yet finished and the examination of Japan's
economic success shows how important the role of the state has b een and still
is. Coming to some conclusions about the (albeit narrowing) gap of the scope of
the nation state paradigm between Japan and other major countries may be more
important than theorising about the disappearance of that paradigm!

The investigation of Japan's power and its exercise is also urgent because of
the either inarticulate, or highly emotionally expressed suspicion abroad as
well as in Japan about Japan's power potential, intentions and future path.
Insufficient understanding of the political economic system easily leads to
conspiracy theories or negative assumptions of Japan's intentions. Is the
occurrence of a 'strategic breakout' not unavoidable in view of Japan's past and
present power? Or are there blind forces at work? Is Japan a 'Godzilla whose
trashing tail flattens buildings quite unintentionally as it blunders about'?5
Some worry about the gap between Japan's economic power and the country's
ability to handle it:

No matter how powerful a country is militarily or economically, nor how
well-meaning its intention to use that power to bring about regional peace and
prosperity, its actions can lead to totally undesired consequences if that
country cannot judge how to use its power appropriately. Sound judgment demands,
above all, in-depth knowledge of the region concerned and the capacity to
analyse situations and plan optimal course of action. The next requisite is the
conceptional ability to translate this into national policy. These qualities,
even more important than the possession of economic power, are sadly lacking in
Japan.6

Finally the cacophony of opinions and statements coming out of Japan which range
from pacifist to right wing, bewilder most who still assume at least
unconsciously Japan to be a homogeneous country with one voice.

The question of Japanese power has implications for the Japan policies of other
countries which for example expect Japan to contribute to the international
system in a way commensurate with its eco nomic power. They exert strong
influence (commonly referred to in Japan as 'gaiatsu') on Japan to this effect.
As a result it is most opportune to appreciate in a more systematic way what
sort of power Japan has, how and if at all this power is exerted, whether the
demand for 'commensurate contribution' is compatible with the internal and
external conditions Japan is facing, and whether those making these requests are
conscious of the implications. It is obvious, but often not fully realized, that
such contributions imply the exertion of power, and this has important
implications for the world system, including for the relative power of the other
countries. There are even Japanese who have ask themselves whether the outside
world really wants to face these consequences.7

Looming behind the questions about Japan's future path is often the assumption
that big economic power leads sooner or later to political power and eventually
to military power. The Realist School in International Relations has always
insisted that 'Countries with great power economics have become great military
powers, whether or not reluctantly.'8

Andrew Hanami argues that 'by providing a means and pressuring Japan to ratchet
up incrementally to a level approaching intermittent parity and inter
operability across a range of military capabilities, the Americans have caused
Japan to become a key mover in the "balance" of power in Northeast Asia.'9 So
when will Japan's 'strategic breakout' happen?

Concern about the future path of Japanese power is most acute in Asia. Against
the background of Japan's past actions in that region, Asians are asking them-
selves about the possibility of Japan tur ning its economic power into military
power as the following statement by the Southeast Asian scholar Chin Kin Wah
illustrates:

In the Asia-Pacific, Japan is already an economic superpower by any measurement
(gross national product, level of technology, foreign trade, international
financial power, innovation in research and technology, and quality of human
resources and organization). These are also the assets and attributes which can
readily be converted to military power. As Lee Kuan Yew put it ... the
possibility of Japan as an independent military power at the turn of the
twentieth century is a horrendous one, such a possibility being real given the
Japanese propensity to be 'Number One' in whatever they seek to accomplish.10

The puzzle of Japan's power

Although there is broad agreement that Japan has power, there are considerable
differences on exactly what kind of power and in what areas. Is it an economic
superpower but a political and military dwarf? How if at all is this power
instrumentalized and exerted, and particularly to where is this kind of power
leading Japan?

Answers to these question depend very much on the respective observer and
whether the intention is to warn of Japan's power, whether Japan is to be
invited to 'behave' (for example burden sharing) ac cording to its power or
whether the intention is rather to cloud the issue of power in order to escape
some of the consequences of big power status.

Many observers are puzzled that despite all the apparent components of power
which Japan undisputedly possesses due to its economic success at home and
abroad, this power seems not to be instrumental ized to achieve any apparent
goal, except perhaps narrow economic goals, or if it is exercized for broader
economic or even political goals, it is done so reluctantly or at least
differently from the way traditional big powers do it. How to explain this
'paradox of unrealized power'?11 Moreover, Japan's national interests seemed to
be achieved in a very cost-efficient way and Japan has therefo re been accused
of being a reactive state and of being a free rider.

Inoguchi Takashi writes that Japan has the image of being 'adrift, with an ad
hoc, opportunistic, and short-term pragmatism', but on the other hand projecting
the image of an actor 'determinedly and tenaciously steadfast to its national
interests'.12 Kataoka Tetsuya eloquently encapsulated this frustration of the
observer in understanding the co-existence of certain classic power components
with what he calls 'idle power' in the following way:

By general consent there is in Japan a strange combination of strength and
weakness, resilience and fragility, expansiveness and subservience,
aggressiveness and self-effacement, keen competitiviness and placid stupor,
cohesion (or "consensus") and apparent headlessness, and cynicism and
innocence.13

Not only seems Japan not to instrumentalize its power, at least not
commensurately with its economic power, there is also no apparent leadership nor
master plan for Japan's foreign and economic policies. Van Wolferen obscures
this issue more than he clarifies it by speaking in his book of 'the system'.14
Instead of saying that the buck does not stop but rather keeps circulating, it
may be more appropriate to say that the buck often suddenly disappears and may
not necessarily reappear.

Failure to understand Japan?

The problem of the alleged puzzle of Japan's power is emphasized by the
Revisionist School which asserts that social sciences have failed to explain
Japan. Karel van Wolferen states when discussing g overnment and interest groups
that 'We are dealing not with lobbies but with a structural phenomenon
unaccounted for in the categories of accepted political theory.'15 Chalmers
Johnson wrote in 1989 that 'Modern East Asia is a junkyard for Western theories
of economic development and political modernization, and it is wise to remind
ourselves of the area's profound exceptionalism whenever approaching a
theory-intensive subject like democracy.'16

This author disagrees with such a perspective of the 'failure' of social
sciences in view of the available social science literature on Japan, notably
the works written by the revisionists themselves . It is also counterproductive
and water on the mills of those Japanese and non-Japanese writers about Japan
who insist on Japan's uniqueness, either to argue in favour of a Japanese for-
eign policy which is solely concerned with direct economic benefits or who
support an exclusive and protectionist approach to Japan.

What has failed is not social sciences but rather our application of social
science approaches and the damage of focusing too narrowly on one single
academic displine, be it the economist, anthropolo gical or political dis-
cipline. The problem has been compounded by the popularity of certain schools
within disciplines which gained too much prominence because they are useful for
certain political interests, such the liberal economist school which con- siders
all problems being taken care of in an equitable manner by free market forces,
or the culturalist school in anthropology which consider s that culture
determines everything and therefore nothing can be done about it.

This unsatisfactory use of social science is particularly criticized by Karel
van Wolferen who reviews critically the approach of social sciences to the
concept of power. Unfortunately he distorts po litical science approaches to
power by not taking into account the diversity of these approaches, instead
asserting that social sciences in the postwar period has either eliminated power
from its dis course or at least removed its sharp edges.17 The author will
endeavour in this book to avoid any of the pitfalls of either the culturalist or
revisionist explanation model and agree with Eisenstadt that the problem is not
whether 'culture' or 'social structure' (or history) is the only explanation for
specific institutional or behavioural patterns, but rather which are the
processes through which cultural and structural dimensions of social action are
interwoven in different social and historical settings, and how different modes
of interweaving influence the specific patterns investigated.18

Prof Reinhard Drifte,
Director,
Newcastle East Asia Centre,
Department of Politics,
University of Newcastle upon Tyne,
Newcastle NE1 7RU,
UK.
Tel: (091) 222 6444
Fax: (091) 222 8107