In reply to "Asian Policy Needed", I think that Japan should fundamentally
re-evaluate its short and long-term alternatives. Indeed, it appears to me that
Japan, for too long, has been a part of "the West and Japan". That, I think is
the major cause of why Japan lacks a real "Asia Policy". So, keeping these
things in mind:

1. (WWII problem) The Japanese government should embark on a well
orchestrated trip to its Asian neighbors to officially apologize. Before this is
done, however, it should make sure that the necessary preparations are made.
Secondly, Japan should require an apology from the United States in regards to
the atomic bombs.

2. (Opening up market) Why open up the market for anyone? Japan is a
neo-mercantilist state- it derives its strength from its accumulated capital.
This implies two things:
1. Japan has a vested interest in maintaining a reasonable
trade surplus. Japan needs only to make sure that wealth flows to Asia, away
from Europe and America (for some time to come). Orchestrating the appropriate
policies that allow other Asian nations to mature as mecantilist states will
enhance Japan's stature in Asia. Therefore, Japan should not adopt "a liberal"
approach to int. political economy. Other Asian states would emulate Japan,
thereby creating a shared economic approach.

2. Drifting of wealth to Asia and Japanese policies that
facilitate this for Asia will assist in dealing with the WW II problem and the
AMPO. (The later by increasing Asia's confidence in Japan and the US will de
facto leave after it realizes that there are no American interests served by the
treaty.)

3. (AMPO) I think AMPO exists to reassure other Asian nations that Japan
will not become a belligerent military state. If (2) above is followed, AMPO
will no longer be feasible or desirable for any party. Japan therefore, must
convince its neighbors that "it will never resort to military means". To do
this, in part, Japan must come to terms with the WWII problem and coming up with
the appropriate confidence building measures.

In other words, these three areas are related and will require a coordinated
Japanese approach, not a West or American approach disguised as Japanese,
something akin to the present Constitution.

-----------------
Date: Tue, 19 Sep
From: Vincent K Pollard

This is a narrowly focused response to the second of the three suggested points
for policy.

In two somewhat different respects, Japan's position in a US-dominated security
network appears like that of the Philippines until a few years ago.

Having been defeated by the United States in the Philippine-American War, the
first Asian republic gave way to an American colony. That weas the origin of US
military bases in the Philippines. Japan also was defeated by the United States
and, during 1945-1952 was a virtual US colony. To oversimplify--but not by
much-- that experience occasioned US military bases on Japanese soil.

Although the 8 August 1967 ASEAN Declaration asserted that foreign military
bases in Southeast Asia were "temporary in nature," ASEAN never put public
pressure on the Republic of the Philippines to give the Americans their walking
papers. This despite other statements and declarations in the years since 1967.
Indeed, there is indirect and direct evidence that ASEAN members Indonesia,
Singapore and Thailand wanted the US bases to stay -- in the Philippines. But
even after former President Aquino's public statement at the ASEAN Heads of
State Summit in Manila in early December 1967, ASEAN member countries (then also
including Brunei and Malaysia, as wll as the other four) were willing to let the
Philippines bear the social and political costs of having the US facilities on
Philippine military bases- -- all alone. (In no way is this formulation intended
to argue retrospectively for US military facilities in the Republic of the
Philippines; it simply summarizes the discomfort of the highest policy makers of
the RP at the time.) Analogous is the position of some Japanese policy makers
today, it seems. On the one hand, the US military facilities in Japan are not
uniformly popular in Japanese society. On the other hand, whatever other
governments in East and Southeast Asia are willing to say privately about their
view of the desirability of US military facilities in Japan, they are most
reluctant to give strong public support to the continuing presence of US
military facilities in the Northeast Asian archipelago.

So, it seems that the governmental supporters of continuing the colonial legacy
(1945-1952) of foreign military bases in Japan have one flank exposed internally
-- without the kind of public support from East and South Asian governments that
would offset some degree of domestic criticism of the foreign military bases.

I started out by saying that this is a narrowly focused comment. It is narrowly
focused to the extent that it appears to accept the presence of US bases in
Japan as a good thing.

While I don't expect radical changes in the next five years, it will be
interesting to see the day when Japan is able to do what the Philippines did in
September of 1991, namely, to let the Americans know that they will have to
leave the bases and go home.

Vincent Kelly Pollard
Universities of Hawai'i & the Philippines