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September 13, 1995
[SSJ: 280] Collective/Rational Choice
From: Iwato Hashimori
Posted Date: 1995/09/13
Way back in the 19th century Emil Durkheim, a French anthropologist wrote about
what he called the collective consciousness. It is likely not by chance that
still today we cannot agree on what collective choice is all about.
It would seem to me that we need to separate clearly what we mean by individual
choice, collective choice and rational choice. If we are simply substituting the
word rational for the word individual, then what have we accomplished? That
individuals make rational choices and groups do not? Or alternatively, that only
individuals can make choices and groups do something else?
Indeed, it is those among us who equate rational choice with individual choice,
and collective choice with systematic negotiation within a given set of rules
created by rational individuals to reach consensus about special problems which
requre collective action to achieve, which are forcing the issue.
What makes rational choice work in the market place, is that the individual is
ultimately responsible for his actions. What makes rational choice unappealing
in the political arena, is that individual responsibility is often absent. When
the individual goes into the market place to make a purchase, he must make a
decision for whose consequence he his almost entirely responsible. The money
which he pays for the purchase of goods and services comes more often than not
out of his own pocket and no one elses. Moreover, buying and selling is a highly
quantifiable transaction whose very nature lends itself to rational thinking.
When individuals get together to reach a collective decision, however,
individual responsibility takes a back seat. Furthermore, in the political
arena, many of the decisions which must be made are lacking in mathematical
rigour.
Even if we ignore the notion of a collective consciousness for the moment and
consider only the structured set of rules within which negotiation takes place,
predicted outcomes are often not realizable. This is because human behavior is
complex, and rules, be they dictated arbitrarily and unilaterally, or carefully
negotiated between two or more parties, are simple by comparison. Consequently,
there will always exist a large number of ways in which individuals, who are
partners to a negotiation, can side-step the agreed upon stipulations.
In like manner principal/agent theory is also weak. Whereas the principal
dictates the rules of the contract unilaterally, and the agent either accepts or
does not, still the agent can find ways to get around the stipulations of the
contract to which he becomes partner. Shirking is only one form of task
avoidance -- there are many many others. Moreover, principal/agent theory
assumes that the principal is some sort of "good guy" whose responsiblity it is
to make sure the agent, the "bad guy", performs his contracted duties. In the
end, what is to stop the principal from trying to capture more benefit from the
agent, than that to which the agent has agreed?
Now to return to the more important notion -- collective choice. My essay on
lion pride was not entirely tongue and cheek; although, I must admit I had fun
writing it. I am happy that it received the attention that it did.
I believe there is an element of collective choice which is vital -- i.e., the
monkey aspect. A group, just like a living organism, is a kind of system with a
life of its own which transcends that of any individual member. If it were
otherwise, no individual would ever seek to defend the group to an extent
greater than that from which he could receive benefit. Granted history is
profuse with traitors, and punitive sanctions are a strong disincentive for
nonparticipation in group activities, but these alone are hardly sufficient to
explain war, corporate allegiance, union solidarity, and family survival.
On the lighter side:
Is it possible that female dominance in the lion pride is not the result of the
female cat's preference for sex over food. After all, could it not be the case
that fat cats are slow, and lean cats are fast, and that the female cat could
care less, that she doesn't eat more of her own kill, just so long as she gets
the fat cuddly males to go to bed with her.
Hashimori Iwato
Approved by ssjmod at 12:00 AM