Thies is quite correct in noting that the utility of the rational-choice (or we
should say principal-agent) framework lies in comparative studies--across
nations, across policy areas, or across time. Actually, given that this paradigm
has now been around for a while, I am puzzled as to why we haven't seen such
studies yet. A paper by Michael Bailey at the APSA tried to do that across
policy areas in Japan and the US (I haven't seen the R&R book on prewar Japan)
but there hasn't been much to argue about yet.

I would add that as well as "comparative statics" for comparisons over time, one
can also do "dynamic" analysis by looking at a particular policy change and then
looking back to see what was it that changed earlier to "cause" that policy
change. For that approach, I would commend Frances Rosenbluth's first book on
financial deregulation, which was good on how environmental change affected the
interests of banks and security houses etc, leading them to push for policy
change, which was then constrained by the balance of power represented through
the LDP (a pretty rough paraphrase, sorry).

The key, here as in most social science, is being clear about the dependent
variable. What are we trying to explain? One possibility is to try to explain
the existence or nature of an institution (or an institutionalized
relationship). Here I have learned a lot from the P-A approach--theoretically,
about the importance of structurally induced equilibria, and re Japan, e.g.,
about the nature of the relationship between backbenchers and the party
leadership in the LDP. I think R&R are quite right in observing that the
rank-and-file "hire" the big three to prevent demands for too much spending or
whatever from getting out of control. I had been working on that sort of stuff
for years and that angle had never occurred to me. It leads us to think about
the changes in the environment that would affect how much slack the big three
gets.

If we are interested in explaining policy content rather than institutions, the
P-A approach hasn't shown us much so far in my opinion. True, at the very
broadest level, it argues that the basic policies of postwar Japan (US alliance,
economic growth, etc etc) are in line with LDP interests. Of course, that had
been Muramatsu's point for years, and indeed how could it be otherwise except in
the most unsophisticated bureaucratic-dominance models? But at more specific
levels, the P-A rhetoric implies that we can understand a lot about public
policy by looking at LDP interests. That works fine for stuff we already
know--Dietmen are influential in rice policy and public works--but does not seem
to have added much explanatory power. To the extent there is a lot of "slack" in
the relationship between party and ministry, it really doesn't matter which one
has more "power."

Finally, Thies said "First of all,the reconceptualization of the relationship
between burs and pols as one of delegation and not as a power struggle with no
indentifiable rules or resources represents a huge step forward." Could he give
us a cite as to where we are stepping forward from? I can't think of any book or
article that portrayed the bur-LDP relationship that way, unless he is thinking
of works by journalists.

[Moderator's Note: The work by Frances Rosenbluth mentioned above is _Financial
Politics in Contemporary Japan_ Cornell Univ. Press, 1989.]