Bernie Silberman's very interesting and informative comment on rat choice , and
that we need to distinguish between different types of "rationality" and rat
choice approaches, brings up the principal-agent assumptions of some of the
genre.

From what I have read, at least as applied in the Japan field, one of the major
problems with such approaches is that they assume a clear distinction between
principal and agent, and that because principals are empowered by authoritative
rules, they have power over agents and agents must follow their decisions.

This has two major problems:

1)in real life agents also influence the conceptions, goals, and decisions of
principals.

2)it usually winds up in a totally tautological analysis, to wit: principals are
the authoritative decision makers and agents must follow their decisions; agents
follow the principals' decisions because the rules say they must; qed:
principals are more powerful than agents.

Comments?
Best, Ellis Krauss