I have been a silent reader of SSJ for a while and now would like to take this
opportunity to introduce the arguments in my book on the Japanese prime minister

(titled, Sori Daijin no Kenryoku to Shidoryoku: Yoshida Shigeru kara Murayama
Tomiichi made, published by Toyo Keizai Shimpo in October 1994; based on my
Ph.D. dissertation at SAIS, Johns Hopkins Univ.). In contrast to Dr. Kenji
Hayao's book, mentioned by Dr. Campbell, which focuses on the obstacles the
prime minister faces, my book looks into his sources of power.

In direct response to the previous discussion on who is a typical prime
minister, it is probably not useful to determine because each prime minister has
a different set of sources of power. His leadership style is determined by the
political resources available to him and by how he utilizes them. Since
executive power is vested in the cabinet, which requires unanimous consent, and
not in the prime minister, his legal authority is limited. The prime minister's
effectiveness in pursuing his policies, therefore, depends in good measure on
various informal sources of power. Informal sources can be divided in two major
categories, "internal" and "external."

Among the most important "internal" political resources are the prime minister's
power base within the government party and his ties with the bureaucracy and the
opposition parties. Sato, Tanaka, and Takeshita successfully utilized these
internal resources.

"External" support is also important. Popularity, for example, plays an
increasingly important role in Japanese politics. High popularity helped
Nakasone pursue administrative reforms and Hosokawa pass the political reform
bills. Low popularity, on the other hand, was a factor in forcing Prime
Ministers Yoshida, Kishi, Tanaka, Uno, and Takeshita out of office.

Support from the business community and the United States often plays an
important role in helping the prime minister maintain stability in his
administration. Their disapproval may lead to his resignation. Yoshida,
Hatoyama, Tanaka, and Miki left office soon after the business community
requested their resignations. Suzuki's poor handling of relations with the
United States led to the anti-Suzuki movement within the party, which resulted
in his resignation. Nakasone and Kaifu had friendly relations with American
presidents, which contributed their popularity and stability at home.

I classify the prime ministers' leadership style into four groups by informal
sources of power, which they have and utilize: 1) The Political Insider, 2) the
Grandstander, 3) the Kamikaze Fighter; and 4) the Peace Lover.

The Political Insider is a leader, like Sato, Tanaka and Takeshita, with
abundant internal sources of power who enjoys stable support within the ruling
party and close ties with the bureaucracy and the opposition parties. The other
three leadership styles lack internal sources. The Grandstander, like Nakasone,
Hosokawa and Ikeda in his income doubling policy, directly seeks external
support from the public and the media for his policy goals to supplement his
lack of internal sources of power. The Kamikaze Fighter, like Kishi in the
revision of the US-Japan Security Treaty, tries to achieve an unpopular policy
by sacrificing his political leadership role. The Peace Lover, like Suzuki in
administrative reform, and Kaifu and Miyazawa in political reform, is an
indecisive leader who fails to achieve a controversial policy goal because he
tries to please all the actors.

Murayama is definitely not a Political Insider with his limited support in the
coalition government. He is not a Grandstander, not only because he is not a
popular leader, but also because he has no clear vision. He probably would not
be a Kamikaze Fighter since he does not have a clear policy goal for which he
would sacrifice his political career. My prediction, therefore, is that Murayama
would resign as a Peace Lover without achieving a major policy goal.

I would like to welcome any comments, criticisms and questions.

P.S. I have a short paper (30,000 words) on this subject which I presented at
I-House in June. If anybody is interested, please let me know. I would be happy
to send it through e-mail.

Tomohito Shinoda
Assistant Professor
International University of Japan
Yamato-machi, Minami-Uonuma, Niigata 949-72 Japan tel 0257-79-1112, fax
0257-79-4442
e-mail TOMOHITO[atx]JPNIUJ00.BITNET