From Gerry Curtis, we had a posting that gave several clear, but arguable propositions about party politics. To think out loud and thank Gerry for the stimulation, I want to include my quick reactions as follows:

1. "First, there is no evidence that the new system is producing a party system characterized by clear policy differences between the main parties. Quite the opposite is occurring."

I disagree with the thrust and tone of this statement about public policy differences. There may not be a clear party identity, but the politics of policy are alive. I think that we are as yet far from elections, and this environment does not nurture the differences. To be precise, Curtis is right only insofar as the point is about long-term changes in the party system.

On policy differences among politicians, the evidence is otherwise as in the governor elections. If Aoshima did not stand for killing the exposition in Tokyo, then we are missing a big case. A whole set of pro-business advocates are making noise and taking losses for stopping the exposition--politics matters.
Perhaps we may wait and see also if policy differences have an impact when we finally have an National Assembly election.

In short, to say these is "no evidence" is an overstatement. To say that Shinseito is having trouble with creating an identity is more accurate. To see the overall impact on the party system may require longer time. And yet the basic point, made well in Curtis book, is that the long-term error in a modern party system is well taken.

I also admit that I have looked for something else as you can still see in my 1994 APSA paper at (http://www.glocom.ac.jp/WhatsNew/sja25.html), and that we have yet to find major PARTY differences. Perhaps politicians may make choices without their parties taking on the responsibility of these choices that political leaders must make about Japan's future policies..

2. "Second, the new system is not weakening the links between politician and interest groups but seems to be intensifying them."

I wonder what evidence can be brought to bear. I never thought the new system would curb interest group politics, but I have little confidence about measuring or completely charting the links. Without historical (read time series for the quantitative types), one is left with differing interpretations.

I will note the Curtis view as stating that there is more contact now, and wait to see about spending results. But I argue that surely the financial flows from interest groups to politicians were greater in the late 1980s, and now the interest groups had better pound a way into the Ministry of Finance if they really want something.

3. "Third, the reform supposedly was to create more party- centered and less politician centered election campaigns."

Here I can agree that the politician is increasingly the center of attention, especially as a media figure. Incumbency helps, but skillful use of the media seems even more crucial to me.

Still, party headquarters where people seek to get on the lists for PR districts may prove vital. The Supreme Court recently overturned the appeals of Matsuzaki Tetsuhisa when he was removed from the Japan New Party candidate lists--the move in effect strengthens the hand of party officials. I think that the list system, as well as campaign financing that gives the parties more money, may have effects different than the quick conclusions posted above.

4. "Fourth and a related point is the failure, so far at least, of the new system to reduce the importance of the koenkai."

At the moment, this appears to be the only leg for many candidates to rely upon.
I reserve judgment through a few elections, myself. Perhaps some new mechanisms, especially with the party list, may emerge. Still, I suppose the leading figures will require money, either in their own koenkai or as secretary general of a party. I just wonder if the latter role is not becoming more important over time, and thus diminishing the role of koenkai.

5. "Fifth, the new system does not seem to be fundamentally changing candidate recruitment patterns."

Well, at least by the parties, that seems to be the case. But there will again need to be a few elections to fully convince me that party faithfuls and second generation politicians are truly the future leaders. On the lists, perhaps talents and other media stars can make inroads. I think it too early to make many conclusions.

Note: In conclusion, Curtis writes,

"this case of political engineering is not having the clear effects the engineers anticipated or that many political scientists assumed."

Unintended consequences will keep us all employed as political analysts. Of course, I think that all the projections above may be tested starting with the election (say February of 1996?). Any notion that we can project from current trends about the results may have to return to the impacts of HC PR systems as well as specific trends of the past two years since July 1993.

One more postscript to Hiwatari-san. He writes, "In other words, what changes in party systems can be explained/predicted by examining electoral systems?" I suggest looking at some of Arthur Stockwin's work, including an essay in a book edited by Vernon Bogdanor. Or better yet, catch the train down to Oxford and see him during that wonderful June weather in England.

Steve Anderson
Associate Professor
Center for Global Communications
International University of Japan

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