Dear Professor Rosenbluth,

I have been following your rational-choice work (as well as this discussion) for some time now and must express my appreciation of your insight. I have a specific question regarding your comment on the electoral system:
>c) most importantly,
>there has been no election yet under the new rules. If electoral institutions matter, the people who are elected under different rules should appeal to voters on a different basis. In the Japanese context, there should be less emphasis on catering to organized groups of supporters. But transitions take time. Britain's electoral rules changed in the mid-19th century (1832-46 or so); the corn laws were finally repealed a decade later.

According to Duverger, I assume that one argument is that the introduction of single-member districts will create a party-based, programmatic electoral competition instead of the candidate-based personalistic appeal extent heretofore. Prof. Rosenbluth, you argue that under P-A, "there should be less emphasis on catering to organized groups of supporters." Would not programmatic-appeals, single-member districts and Duverger's laws suggest that there would be more emphasis on catering to organized groups of supporters?

Organized groups of supporters, especially koenkai, would seem to me even more important under a single-member electoral framework; organized groups (excluding koenkai), even more so under a proportional representation framework where partisan affiliation would matter more. In the Japanese context, is this not exacerbated by the heavy restrictions on media campaigning, and a (now) shortened official election campaign period?

Using Prof. Curtis' example of the Beppu dentists, would not the introduction of single-member districts increase the value of organized "hard votes" that would be delivered by such local elites? If one were to extend to a macro-perspective, what about the mixed Japanese single-member, proportional representation electoral system? What effect do you suspect changing these rules of the game will have upon electioneering?

I suspect that in the short-run, changing the rules of the game will instead increase the value of organized hard votes and help to increase the number of nisei-giins at a kokkai-level, among other effects. Changing the rules of the electoral game does not change the organization or existence of elite organizations at the local level (i.e. dentists). Why would MPs suddenly stop attempting to exploit these organizations and their political influence by altered electoral rules? Could you please expand upon your earlier thoughts and respond, if possible, to these ruminations?

Sincerely yours,
Yasunobu Kyogoku
Oxford University