Recent contributors have discussed the question of what empirical events would offer a clear test of P-A hypotheses and specifically of R/R's [i.e., Professors Ramseyer and Rosenbluth's _Japan's Political Marketplace_] application of the P-A approach to Japan. In her most recent contribution, Prof. Rosenbluth claims that not enough time has passed yet to evaluate whether recent events (e.g. new electoral system, new coalition governments) are affecting politics in the predicted way.

There are some R/R hyptheses, however, which (it seems to me) ought to be playing themselves out already. R/R claim in their chapter on the judicial system that the LDP controls appointments to the Supreme Court and demonstrate this (among other ways) by showing how the _age_ of appointees reflects rational incentives faced by the LDP. Politicians in Japan (as elsewhere) face mixed incentives in deciding whether to appoint young or old justices as they attempt to maximize their control of the courts. They could appoint young justices in order make sure their appointees would be on the bench for the maximum length of time or they could appoint older judges with longer records (to establish how they are likely to rule) and less time to develop independence. In the U.S., R/R point out, presidents appoint young justices because they cannot be sure that their party will maintain control of the presidency, sacrificing some "agency slack" in the process. In Japan, in contrast, the LDP has tended to appoint much older justices because, R/R claim, "the LDP holds solid control over the legislature."

If R/R are right that the age of Japanese Supreme Court appointees (under LDP rule) reflected the LDP's control of appointments and the party's rational pursuit of the incentives described, then we ought to see a marked change in the pattern _now_ since it is clear that no party today can count on remaining in control of the Diet in the way the LDP could before. We don't have to wait for new elections or a "pure" non-LDP government to test this R/R hypothesis. As soon as uncertainty about control of the Diet emerged (June 1993), we should have seen much younger Supreme Court appointees.

I propose this test of one R/R hypothesis without actually having the data. I do know there have been some appointments but don't have the information on their ages. If it turns out that they continue to be "old", however, this would seem to suggest that the appointment of justices operates at least partly according to bureaucratic incentives (of MOJ, the court), and not exclusively according to party incentives as suggested by R/R.

Look forward to hearing from someone who does have the data. It would also be interesting if others can look back at their copies of R/R and see if there are other hypotheses there that can already be evaluated in view of recent events.

Len Schoppa
ljs2k[atx]virginia.edu
Department of Government & Foreign Affairs 232 Cabell Hall; University of Virginia; Charlottesville, VA 22901 (804) 924-3211 Fax (804) 924-3359