Dear list members:
I thank Prof. Rosenbulth for her prompt response. It helped make things clear to me.

It still seems, though, that we have a situation in which both politician-dominance and bureaucratic dominance are consistent with well-known facts, regardless of the approach.

It has been suggested that (a) the nature of the rules that govern the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats (including the availability of sanctions), and (b) the capability for, and costs of, monitoring where the contracts are incomplete, are new areas that have not been examined by descriptive analysis. But this asserion depends on how "rules" are defined and how the "capabilities" and "costs" are calculated.

If I recall correctly, Professor Ito Daiichi, by applying organizational theory, did look into the costs and capacity of bureaucratic control (in terms of knowledge) and argued that party control of the bureaucracy (in budgetary politics) and subordinate/client control by the senior bureaucrats (in tax agencies) are limited, which reinforced the idea of a decentralized bureaucracy relatively insulated from political and electoral (but not client) control along the traditional lines of Tsuji Kiyoaki.

So the issue becomes: Can P-A theory provide a general and objective way to measure "rules," "costs" and "capacities, " one superior to "soft" and vague descriptions?

I am particulary interested if such variables as "rules," "costs" and "capacities" can be examined cross-nationally. Because it seems to me, cross-national comparison is something that, at least in the descriptive tradition, allowed researchers to go beyond futile debates that claim opposed conclusions from similar materials. (I also apologize in advance if you have explained the above points in your book, which I cannot review right now, being "on tour.")

But more importantly, I would like to know what would P-A theory look for specifically to judge whether rules ( electoral rules, administrative rules?), costs and capacities have/have not changed during the last two years of coaltion governments.

Indeed, I would like to see a broad debate on whether parties-bureaucracy relations have changed in the last couple of years and how we can tell. Professor Rosenbulth suggested we look into whether the bureaucrats go along with new policies or have successfully stonewalled. Any other ideas? How can the ideas be operationalized?

To put it another way, I assume adherents of the conventional wisdom would cite numerous recent events as proof of bureaucratic dominance. I'm a little skeptical myself. But how can this be questioned?

Nobuhiro Hiwatari